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Abstract 
An intelligent agent will often be uncertain about various properties of its environment, and 
when acting in that environment i will frequently need to quantify its uncertainty. For example, if 
the agent wishes to employ the expected-utility paradigm of decision theory to guide its actions, 
it will need to assign degrees of belief (subjective probabilities) to various assertions. Of course, 
these degrees of belief should not be arbitrary, but rather should be based on the information 
available to the agent. This paper describes one approach for inducing degrees of belief from 
very rich knowledge bases, that can include information about particular individuals, statistical 
correlations, physical laws, and default rules. We call our approach the random-worlds method. 
The method is based on the principle of indifference: it treats all of the worlds the agent considers 
possible as being equally likely. It is able to integrate qualitative default reasoning with quantitative 
probabilistic reasoning by providing a language in which both types of information can be easily 
expressed. Our results show that a number of desiderata that arise in direct inference (reasoning 
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from statistical information to conclusions about individuals) and default reasoning follow directly 
from the semantics of random worlds. For example, random worlds captures important patterns 
of reasoning such as specificity, inheritance, indifference to irrelevant information, and default 
assumptions of independence. Furthermore, the expressive power of the language used and the 
intuitive semantics of random worlds allow the method to deal with problems that are beyond the 
scope of many other nondeductive reasoning systems. 
1. Introduction 
Consider an agent with a knowledge base, KB, who has to make decisions about its 
actions in the world. For example, a doctor may need to decide on a treatment for a 
particular patient, say Eric. The doctor’s knowledge base might contain information of 
different types, including: statistical information, e.g., “80% of patients with jaundice 
have hepatitis”; first-order information, e.g., “all patients with hepatitis have jaundice”; 
default information, e.g., “patients with hepatitis typically have a fever”; and informa- 
tion about the particular patient at hand, e.g., “Eric has jaundice”. In most cases, the 
knowledge base will not contain complete information about a particular individual. 
For example, the doctor may be uncertain about the exact disease that Eric has. Since 
the efficacy of a treatment will almost certainly depend on the disease, it is important 
for the doctor to be able to quantify the relative likelihood of various possibilities. 
More generally, to apply standard tools for decision making such as decision theory 
(see, e.g., [ 49,67]), an agent must assign probabilities, or degrees of belief, to various 
events. For example, the doctor may wish to assign a degree of belief to an event such 
as “Eric has hepatitis”. This paper describes one particular method that allows such an 
agent to use its knowledge base to assign degrees of belief in a principled manner; we 
call this method the random-worlds method. 
There has been a great deal of work addressing aspects of this genera1 problem. 
Two large bodies of work that are particularly relevant are the work on direct inference, 
going back to Reichenbach [ 641, and the various approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Direct inference deals with the problem of deriving degrees of belief from statistical 
information, typically by attempting to find a suitable reference class whose statistics 
can be used to determine the degree of belief. For instance, a suitable reference class for 
the patient Eric might be the class of all patients with jaundice. While direct inference is 
concerned with statistical knowledge, the field of nonmonotonic reasoning, on the other 
hand, deals mostly with knowledge bases that contain default rules. As we shall argue, 
none of the systems proposed for either reference-class reasoning or nonmonotonic 
reasoning can deal adequately with the large and complex knowledge bases we are 
interested in. In particular, none can handle rich knowledge bases that may contain first- 
order, default, and statistical information. The random-worlds approach, on the other 
hand, can deal with such complex knowledge bases, and handles several paradigmatic 
problems in both nonmonotonic and reference-class reasoning remarkably well. 
We now provide a brief overview of the random-worlds approach. We assume that the 
information in the knowledge base is expressed in a variant of the language introduced 
by Bacchus [3]. Bacchus’s language augments first-order logic by allowing statements 
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of the form I]Hep(x) 1 Juun(x) [Ix = 0.8, which says that 80% of patients with jaundice 
have hepatitis. Notice, however, that in finite models this statement has the (probably 
unintended) consequence that the number of patients with jaundice is a multiple of 
5. To avoid this problem, we use approximate equality rather than equality, writing 
IlfWx) I Jaun(x) IL x 0.8, read “approximately 80% of patients with jaundice have 
hepatitis”. Intuitively, this says that the proportion of jaundiced patients with hepatitis is 
close to 80%: i.e., within some tolerance T of 0.8. 
Not only does the use of approximate equality solve the problem of unintended con- 
sequences, it has another significant advantage: it lets us express default information. 
We interpret a statement such as “Birds typically fly” as expressing the statistical as- 
sertion that “Almost all birds fly”. Using approximate equality, we can represent this 
as I]Fly(x) 1 Bird(x)II, M 1. This interpretation is closely related to various approaches 
applying probabilistic semantics to nonmonotonic logic; see Pearl [ 591 for an overview 
of these approaches, and Section 6 for further discussion. 
Having described the language in which our knowledge base is expressed, we now 
need to decide how to assign degrees of belief given a knowledge base. Perhaps the most 
widely used framework for assigning degrees of belief (which are essentially subjective 
probabilities) is the Bayesian paradigm. There, one assumes a space of possibilities and 
a probability distribution over this space (the prior distribution), and calculates posterior 
probabilities by conditioning on what is known (in our case, the knowledge base). To 
use this approach, we must specify the space of possibilities and the distribution over 
it. In Bayesian reasoning, there is relatively little consensus as to how this should be 
done in general. Indeed, the usual philosophy is that these decisions are subjective. The 
difficulty of making these decisions seems to have been an important reason for the 
historic unpopularity of the Bayesian approach in symbolic AI [ 541. 
Our approach is different. We assume that the KB contains all the knowledge the agent 
has, and we allow a very expressive language so as to make this assumption reasonable. 
This assumption means that any knowledge the agent has that could influence the prior 
distribution is already included in the KB. As a consequence, we give a single uniform 
construction of a space of possibilities and a distribution over it. Once we have this 
probability space, we can use the Bayesian approach: to compute the probability of an 
assertion (p given KB, we condition on KB, and then compute the probability of rp using 
the resulting posterior distribution. 
So how do we choose the probability space ? One general strategy, discussed by 
Halpern [ 301, is to give semantics to degrees of belief in terms of a probability distri- 
bution over a set of possible worlds, or first-order models. This semantics clarifies the 
distinction between statistical assertions and degrees of belief. As we suggested above, 
a statistical assertion such as I(Hep(x) I Juun(n) [Ix M 0.8 is true or false in a particular 
world, depending on how many jaundiced patients have hepatitis in that world. On the 
other hand, a degree of belief is neither true nor false in a particular world-it has 
semantics only with respect to the entire set of possible worlds and a probability dis- 
tribution over them. There is no necessary connection between the information in the 
agent’s KB and the distribution over worlds that determines her degrees of belief. How- 
ever, we clearly want there to be some connection. In particular, we want the agent to 
base her degrees of beliefs on her information about the world, including her statistical 
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information. As this paper shows, the random-worlds method is a powerful technique 
for accomplishing this. 
To define our probability space, we have to choose an appropriate set of possible 
worlds. Given some domain of individuals, we stipulate that the set of worlds is simply 
the set of all first-order models over this domain. That is, a possible world corresponds to 
a particular way of interpreting the symbols in the agent’s vocabulary over the domain. 
In our context, we can assume that the “true world” has a finite domain, say of size N. 
In fact, without loss of generality, we assume that the domain is { 1,. . . , N}. 
Having defined the probability space (the set of possible worlds), we must construct 
a probability distribution over this set. For this, we give perhaps the simplest possible 
definition: we assume that all the possible worlds are equally likely (that is, each world 
has the same probability). This can be viewed as an application of the principle of 
in&j@-ence. Since we are assuming that all the agent knows is incorporated in her 
knowledge base, the agent has no a priori reason to prefer one world over the other. It 
is therefore reasonable to view all worlds as equally likely. Interestingly, the principle of 
indifference (sometimes also called the principle of in.wfJicient reason) was originally 
promoted as part of the very definition of probability when the field was originally 
formalized by Jacob Bernoulli and others; the principle was later popularized further 
and applied with considerable success by Laplace. (See [ 291 for a historical discussion.) 
It later fetl into disrepute as a general definition of probability, largely because of the 
existence of paradoxes that arise when the principle is applied to infinite or continuous 
probability spaces. We claim, however, that the principle of indifference can be a natural 
and effective way of assigning degrees of belief in certain contexts, and in particular, in 
the context where we restrict our attention to a finite collection of worlds. 
Combining our choice of possible worlds with the principle of indifference, we obtain 
our prior distribution. We can now induce a degree of belief in rp given KB by condi- 
tioning on KB to obtain a posterior distribution and then computing the probability of 
q according to this new distribution. It is easy to see that, since each world is equally 
likely, the degree of belief in p given KB is the fraction of possible worlds satisfying 
KB that also satisfy cp. 
One problem with the approach as stated so far is that, in general, we do not know the 
domain size N. Typically, however, N is known to be large. We therefore approximate 
the degree of belief for the true but unknown N by computing the limiting value of this 
degree of belief as N grows large. The result is our random-worlds method. 
The key ideas in the approach are not new. Many of them can be found in the work 
of Johnson [ 361 and Carnap [ I 1, 121, although these authors focus on knowledge bases 
that contain only first-order information, and for the most part restrict their attention 
to unary predicates. Related approaches have been used in the more recent works of 
Shastri [ 7 1 ] and of Paris and Vencovska [ 571, in the context of a unary statistical lan- 
guage. Chuaqui’s recent work [ 141 is also relevant. His work, although technically quite 
different from ours, shares the idea of basing a theory of probabilistic reasoning upon 
notions of indifference and symmetry. The works of Chuaqui and Carnap investigate 
very different issues from those we examine in this paper. For example, Carnap, and 
others who later continued to develop his ideas, were very much interested in induc- 
tive learning (especially the problem of learning universal laws). While we believe the 
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question of learning is very important (see Section 7.3)) we have largely concentrated 
on understanding (and generalizing) the process of going from statistical information 
and default rules to inferences about particular individuals. Many of the new results we 
describe reflect this different emphasis. 
Having defined the method, how do we judge its reasonableness? Fortunately, as we 
mentioned, there are two large bodies of work on related problems from which we can 
draw guidance: reference-class reasoning and default reasoning. While none of the solu- 
tions suggested for these problems seems entirely adequate, the years of research have 
resulted in some strong intuitions regarding what answers are intuitively reasonable for 
certain types of queries. Interestingly, these intuitions often lead to identical desiderata. 
In particular, most systems (of both types) espouse some form of preference for more 
specific information and the ability to ignore irrelevant information. We show that the 
random-worlds approach satisfies these desiderata. In fact, in the case of random worlds, 
these properties follow from two much general theorems. We prove that, in those cases 
where there is a specific piece of statistical information that should “obviously” be used 
to determine a degree of belief, random worlds does in fact use this information. The 
different desiderata, such as a preference for more specific information and an indif- 
ference to irrelevant information follow as easy corollaries. We also show that random 
worlds provides reasonable answers in many other contexts, not covered by the standard 
specificity and irrelevance heuristics. Thus, the random-worlds method is indeed a pow- 
erful one, that can deal with rich knowledge bases and still produce the answers that 
people have identified as being the most appropriate ones. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we outline 
some of the major themes and problems in the work on reference classes and on 
default reasoning. Since one of our major claims is that the random-worlds approach 
solves many of these problems, this will help set our work in context. In Section 4, 
we describe the random-worlds method in detail. In Section 5, we state and prove 
a number of general theorems about the properties of the approach, and show how 
various desiderata follow from these theorems. In Section 6 we discuss the problem of 
calculating degrees of belief. Using results from [ 281, we demonstrate a close connection 
between random worlds and maximum entropy in the case of unary knowledge bases. 
Based on this connection, we show that in many cases of interest a maximum-entropy 
computation can be used to calculate an agent’s degree of belief. Furthermore, we show 
that the maximum-entropy approach to default reasoning considered in [23] can be 
embedded in our framework. Finally, we discuss some possible criticisms and limitations 
of the random-worlds method in Section 7 and the possible impact of the method in 
Section 8. 
2. Reference classes 
Strictly speaking, the only necessary relationship between objective knowledge about 
frequencies and proportions on the one hand and degrees of belief on the other hand 
is the simple mathematical fact that they both obey the axioms of probability. But in 
practice we usually hope for a deeper connection: the latter should be based on the 
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former in some “reasonable” way. Of course, the random-worlds approach that we are 
advocating is precisely a theory of how this connection can be made. But our approach 
is far from the first to attempt to connect statistical information and degrees of belief. 
Most of the earlier work is based on the idea of finding a suitable reference class. In this 
section, we review some of this work and show why we believe that this approach, while 
it has some intuitively reasonable properties, is inadequate as a general methodology. 
(See also [8] for further discussion of this issue.) We go into some detail here, since 
the issues that arise provide some motivation for the results that we prove later regarding 
our approach. 
2.1. The basic approach 
The earliest sophisticated attempt at clarifying the connection between objective sta- 
tistical knowledge and degrees of belief, and the basis for most subsequent proposals, 
is due to Reichenbach [ 641. Reichenbach describes the idea as follows: 
If we are asked to find the probability holding for an individual future event, we 
must first incorporate the case in a suitable reference class. An individual thing 
or event may be incorporated in many reference classes . . ,. We then proceed by 
considering the narrowest [smallest] reference class for which suitable statistics 
can be compiled. 
Although not stated explicitly in this quote, Reichenbach’s approach was to equate the 
degree of belief in the individual event with the statistics from the chosen reference 
class. As an example, suppose that we want to determine a probability (i.e., a degree 
of belief) that Eric, a particular patient with jaundice, has the disease hepatitis. The 
particular individual Eric is a member of the class of all patients with jaundice. Hence, 
following Reichenbach, we can use the class of all such patients as a reference class, 
and assign a degree of belief equal to our statistics concerning the frequency of hepatitis 
among this class. If we know that this frequency is 80%, then we would assign a degree 
of belief of 0.8 to the assertion that Eric has hepatitis. 
Reichenbach’s approach consists of ( 1) the postulate that we use the statistics from 
a particular reference class to infer a degree of belief with the same numerical value, 
and (2) some guidance as to how to choose this reference class from a number of 
competing reference classes. We consider each point in turn. 
In general, a reference class is simply a set of domain individuals4 that contains the 
particular individual about whom we wish to reason and for which we have “suitable 
statistics”. In our framework, we may take the set of individuals satisfying a formula 
$(x) to be a reference class. The requirement that the particular individual c we wish to 
reason about belongs to the class is then represented by the logical assertion $(c). s But 
4 These “individuals” might be complex objects (such as sequences of coin tosses) depending on what we 
take as primitive in our ontology. 
s Although the examples in this section deal with reasoning about single individuals, in general both reference- 
class reasoning and random worlds can be applied to queries such as “Did Eric infect Tom”, which involve 
reasoning about a number of individuals simultaneously. In such cases the reference classes will consist of 
sets of ruples of individuals. 
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what does the phrase “suitable statistics” mean? Suppose for now we take a “suitable 
statistic” to be a closed interval that is nontrivial, i.e., that is not [ 0, 11, in which the 
proportion or frequency lies. More precisely, consider some query p(c), where cp is 
some logical assertion and c is a constant, denoting some individual in the domain. 
Then, under this interpretation, q(x) is a reference class for this query if we know 
both e(c) and Ill I 9(x) IL E l~,Pl, f or some nontrivial interval [a, p]. That is, 
we know that c has property $, and that among the class of individuals that possess 
property $, the proportion that also have property p is between LY and /?. If we decide 
that this is the appropriate reference class then, using Reichenbach’s approach, we would 
conclude Pr( rp( c) > E [a, /I], i.e., the probability (degree of belief) that c has property 
(o is between (Y and p. Note that the appropriate reference class for the query p(c) 
depends both on the formula q(x) and on the individual c. 
Given a query a(c), there will in general be many reference classes that are ar- 
guably appropriate for it. For example, suppose we know both fit (c) and &(c), 
and we have two pieces of statistical information: Ilsp(x) I t,bl (x) IIx E [a,, PI] and 
(\pp( x) I $2 (x) IJx E [ a2, &I. In this case both +1 (x) and $2 (x) are reference classes 
for q(c) and, depending on the values of the o’s and p’s, they could assign conflicting 
degrees of belief to (p(c). The second part of Reichenbach’s approach is intended to 
deal with the problem of how to choose a single reference class from a set of possi- 
ble classes. Reichenbach recommended preferring the narrowest (i.e., the smallest, or 
most specific) class. In this example, if we know Vx (et (x) + @z(x)), so that the 
class $1 (x) is a subset of the class @Z(X), then, using Reichenbach’s approach, we 
would take the statistics from the more specific reference class $1 (x) and conclude that 
Pr((o(c)) E [W,Pll. 
These two parts of Reichenbach’s approach-using statistics taken from a class as a 
degree of belief about an individual and preferring statistics from more specific classes- 
are generally reasonable and intuitively compelling when applied to simple examples. 
Of course, even on the simplest examples Reichenbach’s strategy cannot be said to 
be “correct” in any absolute sense. Nevertheless, it is impressive that there is such 
widespread agreement as to the reasonableness of the answers. As we show later, the 
random-worlds approach agrees with both aspects of Reichenbach’s approach when 
applied to simple (and uncontroversial) examples. Unlike that approach, however, the 
random-worlds approach derives these intuitive answers from more basic principles. As 
a result, it is able to deal well with more complex examples that defeat Reichenbach’s 
approach. 
Despite its successes, Reichenbach’s approach has several serious problems. For one 
thing, defining what counts as a “suitable statistic” is not easy. For another, it is clear 
that the principle of preferring more specific information rarely suffices to deal with 
the cases that arise with a rich knowledge base. Nevertheless, much of the work on 
connecting statistical information and degrees of belief, including that of Kyburg [ 41, 
421 and of Pollock [ 611, has built on Reichenbach’s ideas of reference classes by 
elaborating the manner in which choices are made between reference classes. As a 
result, these later approaches all suffer from a similar set of difficulties, which we now 
discuss. 
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2.2. identifying reference classes 
Recall that we took a reference class to be simply a set for which we have “suitable 
statistics”. But if any set of individuals whatsoever can potentially serve as a reference 
class then problems arise. Assume we know Jaun(Eric) and IIHep(x) / Jaun(x)ll, z 
0.8. In this case Jaw(x) is a legitimate reference class for the query Hep(Eric). 
Therefore, we would like to conclude that Pr(Hep(Eric)) = 0.8. But Eric is also a 
member of the more speciJc class of jaundiced patients without hepatitis together with 
(Eric} (‘. ., h 1 I e t e c ass defined by the formula (Jaun( x) A 3fep( x) ) Vn = Eric). If there 
are quite a few jaundiced patients without hepatitis, then we have excellent statistics for 
the proportion of patients in this class with hepatitis: it is approximately 0%. Thus, the 
conclusion that Pr(Hep(Eric)) = 0.8 is disallowed by the rule instructing us to use the 
most specific reference class. In fact, it seems that we can almost always find a more 
specific class that will give a different and intuitively incorrect answer. This example 
suggests that we cannot take an arbitrary set of individuals to be a reference class; it 
must satisfy additional criteria. 
Kyburg and Pollock deal with this difficulty by placing restrictions on the set of allow- 
able reference classes that, although different, have the effect of disallowing disjunctive 
reference classes, including the problematic class described above. This approach suf- 
fers from two deficiencies. First, as Kyburg himself has observed [41], these restrictions 
do not eliminate the problem completely. Furthermore, restricting the set of allowable 
reference classes may prevent us from making full use of the information we have. For 
example, the genetically inherited disease Tay-Sachs (represented by the predicate 73) 
appears only in babies of two distinct populations: Jews of east-European extraction 
(EEJ), and French-Canadians from a certain geographic area (FC). Within the afflicted 
population, Tay-Sachs occurs in 2% of the babies. The agent might represent this fact 
using the statement IITS 1 EZY(x) V FC(x) /I.( = 0.02. However, if disjunctive refer- 
ence classes are disallowed, then the agent would not be able to use this information in 
reasoning. 
It is clear that if one takes the reference-class approach to generating degrees of 
belief, some restrictions on what constitutes a legitimate reference class are inevitable. 
Unfortunately, it seems that the current approaches to this problem are inadequate. The 
random-worlds approach does not depend on the notion of a reference class, and so is 
not forced to confront this issue. 
2.3. Competing reference classes 
Even if the problem of defining the set of “legitimate” reference classes can be 
resolved, the reference-class approach must still address the problem of choosing the 
“right” class out of the set of legitimate ones. The solution to this problem has typically 
been to posit a collection of rules indicating when one reference class should be preferred 
over another. The basic criterion is the one we already mentioned: choose the most 
specific class. But even in the cases to which this specificity rule applies, it is not 
always appropriate. Assume, for example, that we know that between 70% and 80% of 
birds chirp and that between 0% and 99% of magpies chirp. If Tweety is a magpie, 
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the specificity rule would tell us to use the more specific reference class, and conclude 
that Pr( Chilps( Tweery) ) E [ 0,0.99]. Although the interval [0,0.99] is certainly not 
trivial, it is not very meaningful. Had the 0.99 been a 1, the interval would have been 
trivial, and we could have then ignored this class and used the more detailed statistics 
of [ 0.7,0.8] derived from the class of birds. 
The knowledge base above might be appropriate for someone who knows little about 
magpies, and so feels less confidence in his statistics for magpies than in his statistics 
for the class of birds as a whole. But since [0.7,0.8] C_ [0,0.99], we know nothing 
that indicates that magpies are actually different from birds in general with respect to 
chirping. There is an alternative intuition that says that if the statistics for the less 
specific reference class (the class of birds) are more precise, and they do not contradict 
the statistics for the more specific class (magpies), then we should use them. That is, 
we should conclude that Pr( Chirps( Se&y) ) E [ 0.7,0.8]. This intuition is captured 
and generalized in Kyburg’s strength rule. 
Unfortunately, neither the specificity rule nor its extension by Kyburg’s strength rule 
are adequate in most cases. In typical examples, the agent generally has several in- 
comparable classes relevant to the problem, so that neither rule applies. Reference-class 
systems such as Kyburg’s and Pollock’s simply give no useful answer in these cases. For 
example, suppose we know that Fred has high cholesterol and is a heavy smoker, and 
that 15% of people with high cholesterol get heart disease. If this is the only suitable 
reference class, then (according to all the systems) Pr(Heurt-disease(F)) = 0.15. 
On the other hand, suppose we then acquire the additional information that 9% of 
heavy smokers develop heart disease (but still have no nontrivial statistical informa- 
tion about the class of people with both attributes). In this case, neither class is the 
single right reference class, so approaches that rely on finding a single reference class 
generate a trivial range for the degree of belief that Fred will contract heart disease in 
this case. For example, Kyburg’s system will generate the interval [ 0, 1 ] for the degree 
of belief. 
Giving up completely in the face of conflicting evidence seems to us to be inap- 
propriate. The entire enterprise of generating degrees of belief is geared to providing 
the agent with some guidance for its actions (in the form of degrees of belief) when 
deduction is insufficient to provide a definite answer. That is, the aim is to generate 
plausible inferences. The presence of conflicting information does not mean that the 
agent no longer needs guidance. When we have several competing reference classes, 
none of which dominates the others according to specificity or any other rule that 
has been proposed, then the degree of belief should most reasonably be some com- 
bination of the corresponding statistical values. As we show later, the random-worlds 
approach does indeed combine the values from conflicting reference classes in a rea- 
sonable way, giving well-motivated answers even when the reference-class approach 
would fail. 
2.4. Other types of information 
We have already pointed out the problems that arise with the reference-class approach 
if more than one reference class bears on a particular problem. A more subtle problem 
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is encountered in cases where there is relevant information that is not in the form of a 
reference class. We have said that for Q(x) to be a reference class for a query about 
p(c) we must know rl/(c) and have some statistical information about l/q(x) 1 1,4(x) /Ix. 
However, it is not sufficient to consider only the query v(c). Suppose we also know 
p(c) @ a(c) for some other formula u. Then we would want Pr(p(c)) = Pr(cr(c)). 
But this implies that all of the reference classes for (T(C) are relevant as well, because 
anything we can infer about Pr(a( c) ) tells us something about Pr( cp( c) ). Both Pollock 
[61] and Kyburg [42] deal with this by considering all of the reference classes for any 
formula g such that (T(C) @ (p(c) is known. However, they do not consider the case 
where it is known that a(c) + p(c), which implies that Pr( a( c) ) 6 Pr( q( c) ), nor the 
case where it is known that q(c) 3 LT( c), which implies that Pr( a( c) ) > Pr( qp( c) ). 
Thus, if we have a rich theory about (D(C) and its implications, it can become very 
hard to locate all of the possible reference classes or even to define what qualifies as a 
possible reference class. 
2.5. Discussion 
A comparison between random-worlds and reference-class approaches can be made 
in terms of the use of local versus global information. The reference-class approach 
is predicated on the assumption that we can always focus on a single piece of in- 
formation, the statistics over a single reference class, that summarizes all the relevant 
information in the knowledge base. A strategy based on identifying a single relevant 
(“local”) datum can offer great efficiency, but of course we should not expect this to 
be a general substitute for the use of all the (“global”) information we have avail- 
able. In this sense, the difficulties encountered by the reference-class approach are not 
surprising. When generating degrees of belief from a rich knowledge base, it will not 
always be possible to find a single reference class that captures all of the relevant 
information. 
It is important to remember that although the notion of a reference class seems 
intuitive, it arises as part of one proposed solutiotz strategy for the problem of computing 
degrees of belief. The notion of reference classes is not part of the description of the 
problem, and there is no reason for it to necessarily be part of the solution. Indeed, as 
we have tried to argue, making it part of the solution can lead to more problems than it 
solves. 
Our approach makes no attempt to locate a single local piece of information (a 
reference class). Thus, all of the problems described above that arise from trying lo- 
cate the “right” reference class vanish. Rather, it uses a semantic construction that 
takes into account all of the information in the knowledge base in a uniform man- 
ner. As we shall see, the random-worlds approach generates answers that agree with 
the reference-class approach in those special cases where there is a single appropriate 
reference class. However, it continues to give reasonable answers in many situations 
where no single local piece of information suffices. Furthermore, these answers are ob- 
tained directly from the simple semantics of random worlds, with no ad hoc rules and 
assumptions. 
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3. Default reasoning 
One main claim of this paper is that the random-worlds method of inference, coupled 
with our statistical interpretation of defaults, provides a well-motivated and successful 
system of default reasoning. Evaluating such a claim is hard because there are many, 
sometimes rather vague, criteria for success that one can consider. In particular, not all 
criteria are appropriate for all default reasoning systems: different applications (such 
as some of the ones outlined in [53]) require different interpretations for a default 
rule, and therefore need to satisfy different desiderata. Nevertheless, there are certain 
desiderata that have gained acceptance as measures for the success of a new nonmono- 
tonic reasoning system. Some are general properties of nonmonotonic inference (see 
Section 3.2). Most, on the other hand, involve getting the “right” answers to a small 
set of standard examples (more often than not involving a bird called “Tweety”). As 
we claim at the end of this section, this has made an “objective” validation of proposed 
systems difficult, to say the least. In this section, we survey some of the desired proper- 
ties for default reasoning and the associated problems and issues. Of course, our survey 
cannot be comprehensive. The areas we consider are the semantics of defaults, basic 
properties of default inference, inheritance and irrelevance, expressive power, and the 
lottery paradox. 
3.1. Semantics of defaults 
It is possible to discuss some properties of default reasoning systems in an ex- 
tremely abstract fashion (see Section 3.2), but for other properties we need to make 
some assumptions about the type of system being considered. In particular, we con- 
sider systems that incorporate some notion of a default rule, which we now explain. 
In general, a default rule is an expression that has the form A(x) -+ B(x) , whose 
intuitive interpretation is that if A holds for some individual x then typically (nor- 
mally, usually, probably, etc.) B holds for that individual.6 While the syntax actu- 
ally used differs significantly from case to case, most default reasoning systems have 
some construct of this type. For instance, in Reiter’s default logic [65] we would 
write 
A(x) : B(x) 
B(x) ’ 
while in a circumscriptive framework [ 521, we might use 
‘v’x (A(x) A -Ah(x) =+ B(x)), 
while circumscribing Ab( x) . Theories based on first-order conditional logic [ 151 often 
do use the syntax A(x) + B(x). As we said in the introduction, in the random-worlds 
framework this default is captured using the statistical assertion ]I B( x) 1 A(x) (Ix M 1. 
While most systems of default inference have a notion of a default rule, not all of 
them address the issue of what the rule means. In particular, while all systems describe 
6 We use -+ for a default implication, reserving =S for standard material implication. 
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how a default rule should be used, some do not ascribe semantics (or ascribe only 
unintuitive semantics) to such rules. Without a good, intuitive semantics for defaults it 
becomes very difficult to judge the reasonableness of a collection of defaulL statements. 
For example, as we mentioned above, one standard reading of q~ 4 Cc, is “p’s are 
typically G’s”. Under this reading, the pair of defaults A --+ B and A -+ 7B should be 
inconsistent. In approaches such as Reiter’s default logic, A -+ B and A + TB can be 
simultaneously adopted; they are not “contradictory” because there is no relevant notion 
of contradiction. 
In contrast, our approach does give semantics to defaults. In fact, we use a single 
logic and semantics that covers first-order information, default information, and sta- 
tistical information. Such an approach enables us, among other things, to verify the 
consistency of a collection of defaults and to see whether a default follows logically 
from a collection of defaults. Of other existing theories, those based on conditional 
or modal logic come closest to achieving this (see [IO] for further discussion of this 
point). 
3.2. Properties of default inference 
As we said, default reasoning systems have typically been measured by testing them 
on a number of important examples. Recently, a few tools have been developed that 
improve upon this approach. Gabbay [ 181 (and later Makinson [ 501 and Kraus, 
Lehmann, and Magidor [39]) introduced the idea of investigating the input/output 
relation of a default reasoning system, with respect to certain general properties that 
such an inference relation might possess. Makinson [ 511 gives a detailed survey of this 
work. 
The idea is simple. Fix a theory of default reasoning and let KB be some knowledge 
base appropriate to this theory. Suppose q ‘is a default conclusion reached from KB 
according to the particular default approach being considered. In this case, we write 
KB i_ p. The relation b clearly depends on the default theory being considered. It is 
necessary to assume in this context that KB and q are both expressed in the same logical 
language, and that the language has a notion of valid implication. Thus, for example, if 
we are considering default logic or e-semantics, we must assume that the defaults are 
fixed (and incorporated into the notion of i_ ) and that both KB and p are first-order 
or propositional formulas. Similarly, in the case of circumscription, the circumscriptive 
policy must also be fixed and incorporated into k (See also the discussion at the 
beginning of Section 3.3.) 
With this machinery we can state a few desirable properties of default theories in a 
way that is independent of the (very diverse) details of such theories. There are five 
properties of k that have been viewed as being particularly desirable [ 391: 
l Right Weakening. If qo + I++ is logically valid and KB k p, then KB i_ @. 
l Reflexivity. KB k KB. 
l Left Logical Equivalence. If KB H KB’ is logically valid, then KB /-- p if and only 
if KB’ b 40. 
l Cut. If KB k 6, and KB A 0 f-- cp then KB i_ p. 
l Cautious Monotonic&. If KB k 6 and KB k p then KB A 6’ b 40. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to defend these criteria (see [ 39]), we do 
want to stress Cut and Cautious Monotonicity, since they will be useful in our later 
results. They tell us that we can safely add to KB any conclusion 0 that we can derive 
from KB, where “safely” is interpreted to mean that the set of conclusions derivable 
(via k ) from KB A B is precisely the same as that derivable from KB alone. 
As shown in [ 391, numerous other conditions can be derived from these properties. 
For example, we can prove: 
l And. If KB t_ 40 and KB k I+? then KB k cp A t+b. 
Other plausible properties, however, do not follow from these basic five. For example, 
the following property captures reasoning by cases: 
l Or. If KB t_ p and KB’ k cp, then KB V KB’ k rp. 
Perhaps the most interesting property that does not follow from the basic five prop- 
erties is what has been called RationaE Monotonicity [ 391. Note that the property of 
(full) monotonicity, which we do not want, says that KB /- cp implies KB A 0 b qo, 
no matter what 0 is. It has been argued that default reasoning should satisfy the same 
property in those cases where 0 is “irrelevant” to the connection between KB and rp. 
While it is difficult to characterize “irrelevance”, one situation where we may believe 
that 8 should not affect the conclusions we can derive from KB is if 6 is not implausible 
given KB, i.e., if it is not the case that KB b -8 (see Section 3.3 for an example). The 
following property asserts that monotonicity holds when adding such a formula 8 to our 
knowledge base: 
l Rational Monotonic&y. If KB k ~0 and it is not the case that KB k -8, then KB A 
0 i- 50. 
Rational Monotonicity is a fairly strong property, and is certainly not universally 
agreed upon (see [ 5 1 ] for a discussion, and some weakened versions). However, several 
people, notably Lehmann and Magidor [47], have argued strongly for the desirability 
of this principle. One advantage of Rational Monotonicity is that it covers some fairly 
noncontroversial patterns of reasoning involving property inheritance. We explore this 
further in the next section. As is demonstrated in Section 5.1, our approach satisfies a 
slightly weakened version of Rational Monotonicity. 
The set of properties we have discussed provides a simple, but useful, system for clas- 
sifying default theories. There are certainly applications in which some of the properties 
are inappropriate; Reiter’s default logic is still popular even though it does not satisfy 
Cautious Monotonicity, Or, or Rational Monotonicity [ 511. (We briefly discuss one of 
the consequent disadvantages of default logic in the next section.) Nevertheless, many 
people would argue that the five core properties given above constitute a reasonable, if 
incomplete, set of desiderata for mainstream default theories. 
3.3. Specijcity and inheritance 
As we have pointed out, systems of default reasoning have particular mechanisms 
for expressing default rules. A collection of such rules (perhaps in conjunction with 
other information) forms a default theory (or default knowledge base). For example, 
a particular default theory KBd,f might contain the default “A’s are typically B’s”; 
we denote this by writing (A(x) -+ B(x)) E KBd+ A default theory K&f is used 
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by a default reasoning system in order to reason from various premises to default 
conclusions. For example, a theory K&,f containing the above default might infer B(c) 
from A(c). Let k&f indicate the input/output relationship generated by a particular 
default reasoning system that uses K&j+ Thus, A(c) k&t B(c) indicates that this default 
reasoning system is able to conclude B(c) from the premise A(c) using the default 
theory KBd+ In this section we examine some additional properties we might like FJ~~ 
to satisfy. 
Clearly, the presence of a default rule in a theory does not necessarily mean that 
the associated default reasoning system will (or should) apply that rule to any par- 
ticular individual. Nevertheless, unless something special is known about that indi- 
vidual, the following seems to be an obvious requirement for any default reasoning 
system: 
l Direct lnfereuce for Defaults. If (A(x) + B(x)) E KBd,t and KBd,f contains no 
assertions mentioning c, then A(c) kdet B(c) . 
This requirement has been previously discussed by Poole [ 631, who called it the prop- 
erty of Conditioning. We have chosen a different name that relates the property more 
directly to earlier notions arising in work on direct inference. 
We view Direct Inference for Defaults as stating a (very weak) condition for how a 
default theory should behave on some of the simpler problems involving hierarchies of 
classes and default properties. Consider the following standard example, in which our 
default knowledge base KBflY is 
Bird(x) + Fly(x) , 
fenguin( x) -+ -Fly(X) , 
‘dx (Penguin(x) + Bird(x) ) 
Should Tweety the penguin inherit the property of flying from the class of birds, 
or the property of not flying from the class of penguins? For any system satisfying 
Direct lrlference for Defaults we must have Penguin( Tweety) hX lFly( Tweety). So 
long as the system treats universals in a reasonable manner, this will be equivalent to 
Penguin( Tweety) A Bird( Tweety) htJ lF!\( Tweety). Thus we see that if a system satis- 
fies Direct Inference for Defaults, then it automatically satisfies a form of speciJicit_v---the 
preference for more specific defaults. Specificity in default reasoning is, of course, di- 
rectly related to the preference for more specific subsets that we saw in the context 
of reference-class reasoning. Specificity is one of the least controversial desiderata in 
default reasoning. 
In approaches such as default reasoning or circumscription, the most obvious encoding 
of these defaults satisfies neither Direct Inference for Defaults nor specificity. However, 
default logic and circumscription are certainly powerful enough for us to be able to 
arrange specificity if we wish. For example, in default logic, this can be done by means 
of nonnormal defaults [ 661. There is a cost to doing this, however: adding a default rule 
can require that all older default rules be reexamined, and possibly changed, to enforce 
the desired precedences. 
Direct Inference for Defuults is a weak principle, since in most interesting cases there 
is no default that fits the case at hand perfectly. Suppose we learn that Tweety is a 
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yellow penguin. Should we still conclude that Tweety does not fly? That is, should we 
conclude Penguin( Tweety) AYellow( Tweety) bJ ~Fly(Tweety)? Most people would say 
we should, because we have been given no reason to suspect hat yellowness is relevant 
to flight. In other words, in the absence of more specific information about yellow 
penguins we should use the most specific superclass for which we do have knowledge, 
namely penguins. The inheritance property, i.e., the ability to inherit defaults from 
superclasses, is a second criterion for successful default reasoning, and is not provided 
by Direct Inference for Defaults. 
In some sense, we can view Rational Monotonicity as providing a partial solution 
to this problem [47]. If a nonmonotonic reasoning system satisfies Rational Mono- 
tonicity in addition to Direct Inference for Defaults then it does achieve inheritance 
in a large number of examples. For instance, we have already observed that Direct 
Inference for Defaults gives Penguin( Tweety) by ~Fly( Tweety), given KBfr,,. Since 
KBp! gives us no reason to believe that yellow penguins are unusual, any reason- 
able default reasoning system would have Penguin( Tweety) /&tj, yYellow( Tweety) . From 
these two statements, Rational Monotonicity allows us to conclude Penguin( Tweety) A 
Yellow( Tweety) by lFly( Tweety), as desired. 
However, Rational Monotonicity is still insufficient for inheritance reasoning in gen- 
eral. Suppose we add the default Bird(x) + Warm-blooded(x) to KBJ~. We would 
surely expect Tweety to be warm-blooded. However, Rational Monotonicity cannot be ap- 
plied here. To see why, observe that Bitd( Tweety) h4y Warm-blooded( Tweety) , while we 
want to conclude that Bird( Tweety) A Penguin( Tweety) ty4y Warm-blooded( Tweety) . ’ 
We could use Rational Monotonicity to go from the first statement to the second, 
if we could show that Bird(Tweety) h? lPenguin( Tweety) . However, most default 
reasoning systems do not support this statement. In fact, since penguins are excep- 
tional birds that do not fly, it is not unreasonable to conclude the contrary, i.e., that 
Bini( Tweety) hy lPenguin(Tweety) . Thus, Rational Monotonicity cannot be used to 
conclude that Tweety the penguin is warm-blooded. 
It seems undesirable that if a subclass is exceptional in any one respect, then inher- 
itance of all other properties is blocked. However, it can be argued that this blocking 
of inheritance to exceptional subclasses i  reasonable. Since penguins are known to be 
exceptional birds perhaps we should be cautious and not allow them to inherit any of 
the normal properties of birds. But even if we accept this argument, here are many 
examples which demonstrate that the complete blocking of inheritance to exceptional 
subclasses yields an inappropriately weak theory of default reasoning. For example, 
suppose we add to KBpy the default Yellow(x) ---f Easy-to-see(x). This differs from 
standard exceptional subclass inheritance in that yellow penguins are not known to be 
exceptional members of the class of yellow things. That is, while penguins are known to 
be somewhat unusual birds (and so perhaps the normal properties of birds should not be 
inherited), there is no reason to suppose that yellow penguins are different from other 
yellow objects. Nevertheless, Rational Monotonicity does not suffice even in this less 
controversial case. Indeed, there are well-known systems that satisfy Rational Mono- 
‘In any system that treats universals reasonably, this is clearly equivalent to the assertion we are really 
interested in: Penguin( liueety) /yy Warm-blooded( Tweety). 
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tonicity but cannot conclude that Tweety, the yellow penguin, is easy to see [ 47,601. 
This problem has been called the drowning problem [ 2,9]. 
Theories of default reasoning have had considerable difficulty in capturing an ability 
to inherit from superclasses that can deal properly with all of these different cases. In 
particular, the problem of inheritance to exceptional subclasses has been the most diffi- 
cult. While some recent propositional theories have been more successful at dealing with 
exceptional subclass inheritance [ 19,2 I, 231, they encounter other difficulties, which we 
discuss in the next section, 
3.4. Expressivity 
In the effort to discover basic techniques and principles for default reasoning, people 
have often looked at weak languages based on propositional logic, For instance, E- 
semantics and variants [20,23], modal approaches such as autoepistemic logic [55], 
and conditional logics [ IO], are usually considered in a propositional framework. Others, 
such as Reiter’s default logic and Delgrande’s conditional logic [ 151, use a first-order 
language, but with a syntax that tends to decouple the issues of first-order reasoning and 
default reasoning; we discuss this below. Of the better-known systems, circumscription 
seems to have the ability, at least in principle, of making the richest use of first-order 
logic. 
It seems uncontroversial that, ultimately, a system of default reasoning should be built 
around a powerful language. Sophisticated knowledge representation systems almost 
invariably use languages with the expressive power of some large fragment of first-order 
logic, if not much more. It is hard or impractical to encode the knowledge we have 
about almost any interesting domain without the expressive power provided by nonunary 
predicates and first-order quantifiers. We would also like to reason logically as well as 
by default within the same system, and to allow perhaps even richer languages. 
It has not been easy to integrate first-order logic and defaults completely. In fact, 
one of the major contributions of our approach is its ability to express both types 
of information in a single language. One difficulty for other approaches concerns 
“open” defaults, that are intended to apply to all individuals. For instance, suppose 
we wish to make a general statement that birds typically fly, and be able to use this 
when reasoning about different birds. Let us examine how some existing systems do 
this. 
In propositional approaches, the usual strategy is to claim that there are different types 
of knowledge (see, for example, [ 2 I ] and the references therein). General defaults, such 
as Bird ---f Fly, are in one class. When we reason about an individual, such as Tweety, 
its properties are described by knowledge in a different class, the context, For Tweety, 
the context might be Bird A Yellow. In a sense, the symbol Bird stands for a general 
property when used in a default and talks about Tweety (say) when it appears in the 
context. First-order approaches have more expressive power in this regard. For example, 
Reiter’s default logic uses defaults with free variables, e.g., Bird(x) 4 Fly(x). That 
Tweety is a bird can then be written Bird( Tweet?). which seems much more natural. 
The default itself is treated essentially as a schema, implying all substitution instances 
(such as Bird( Tweety) --i Fly( Tweety) ). 
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One example shows the difficulties with both of these approaches. Suppose we know 
that: 
Elephants typically like zookeepers. 
Fred is a zookeeper, but elephants typically do not like Fred. 
Clyde is an elephant. 
Eric is a zookeeper. 
Using this information we can apply specificity to determine reasonable answers to 
such questions as “Does Clyde like Fred ?’ (No) or “Does Clyde like Eric” (Yes). But 
the propositional strategy of classifying knowledge seems to fail here. Is “Elephants 
typically do not like Fred” a general default, or an item of contextual knowledge? Since 
it talks about elephants in general and also about one particular zookeeper, it does not 
fit either category well. In a rich first-order language, there is no clear-cut distinction 
between specific facts and general knowledge (nor do we believe there should be 
one). 
Next, consider the first-order substitutional approach. It is easy to see that this does 
not work at all. One substitution instance of 
Elephant(x) A Zookeeper( y) ---t Likes( x, y) 
is 
Elephant(x) A Zookeeper( Fred) + Likes( x, Fred), 
which will contradict the second default. Of course, we could explicitly exclude Fred: 
Elephant(x) A Zookeeper( y) A y # Fred -+ Likes( x, y) . 
However, explicit exclusion is similar to the process of explicitly disabling less specific 
defaults, mentioned in the previous section, Both destroy the modularity of the knowl- 
edge base, i.e., the form of a default becomes dependent on what other defaults are in 
the knowledge base. Hence, these techniques are highly impractical for large knowledge 
bases. 
The zookeeper example is similar to an example given by Lehmann and Magidor 
[ 461. However, the solution they suggest to this problem does not provide an explicit 
interpretation for open defaults. Rather, the “meaning” of an open default is implicitly 
determined by a set of rules provided for manipulating such defaults. These rules can 
cope with the zookeeper example, but the key step in the application of these rules is 
the use of Rational Monotonicity. More precisely, Lehmann and Magidor’s argument 
applies to systems which, given the premise Elephant(x) A Zookeeper( can infer 
by default that Likes(x, y) (i.e., Elephant(x) A Zookeeper b Likes(x, y)) and yet 
cannot infer either x # CZyde or y # Eric. The latter certainly seem reasonable since 
we know nothing whatsoever about Clyde or Eric. Now, however, we can apply Rational 
Monotonicity twice, which effectively allows us to assume (i.e., add to the premises) 
that x = Clyde A y = Eric, while still concluding Likes( x, y). Finally, ReJlexivity, Right 
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Weakening, and Left Logical Equivalence can be used to justify substituting for x and 
y; we obtain 
Elephant( Clyde) A Zookeeper( Eric) k Likes( Clyde, Eric), 
as desired. The key point is that this argument will typically fail for Fred, because we 
do have reason to believe that Fred is unusual (and so, in many systems, we could 
conclude by default that y # Fred). Thus, as we would hope, we cannot conclude 
that Likes( Clyde, Fred), and in fact it is easy to argue analogously that we conclude 
TLikes( Clyde, Fred) using the second default. But while Rational Monotonicity helps 
in this example, we have, in Section 3.3, already seen its main failing: it is easily 
blocked by “irrelevant” exceptionality. For example, if Eric is known to be excep- 
tional in some way (even one unrelated to zookeeping), then Lehmann and Magidor’s 
approach will not be able conclude that he is liked by Clyde. This is surely undesir- 
able. 
Thus, it seems to be very hard to interpret generic (open) defaults properly. This is 
perhaps the best-known issue regarding the expressive power of various approaches to 
default logic. There are, of course, others; we close by mentioning one. 
Morreau [56] has discussed the usefulness of being able to refer to “the class of 
individuals satisfying a certain default”. For example, the assertion: 
Typically, people who normally go to bed late normally rise late, 
refers to “the class of people who normally go to bed late”. The structure of this assertion 
is essentially: 
(Day(y) + To-bed-late( x, y) ) -+ (Day( y’) --+ Rises-late( x, y’) ) . 
This is a default whose precondition and conclusion are descriptions of people whose 
behaviors are themselves defined using defaults. Such defaults appear to pose problems 
for most existing default theories. Reiter’s default logic cannot express such defaults. 
And while some theories of conditional logic (for example, those of [ 10,151) can 
express this example, they are as yet incapable of generating reasonable inferences 
from nested defaults of this type. Circumscription, on the other hand, could perhaps be 
configured to cope with this example, but precisely how this could be accomplished is 
not obvious to us. We also note that the example has many variants. For instance, there 
is clearly a difference between the above default and the one “Typically, people who 
go to bed late rise late (i.e., the next morning)“; formally, the latter statement could be 
written: 
(Day(y) A To-bed-late( x, y) ) + Rises-late( x, Next-day( y) ) . 
There are also other variations. We would like to express and reason correctly with 
them all. The real issue here is that we need to define various properties of individuals, 
and while many of these properties can be expressed in first-order logic, others need to 
refer to defaults explicitly. This argues, yet again, that it is a mistake to have a different 
language for defaults than the one used for other knowledge. 
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3.5. The lottery paradox 
The lottery paradox [40] addresses the issue of how different default conclusions 
interact. It provides a challenging test of the intuitions and semantics of any default 
reasoning system. There are a number of issues raised by this paradox; we consider 
three here. 
First, imagine that a large number N of people buy tickets to a lottery in which there 
is only one winner. For a particular person c, it seems sensible to conclude by default 
that c does not win the lottery. But we can argue this way for every individual, which 
seems to contradict the fact that someone definitely will win. Of course some theories, 
such as those based on propositional languages, do not have enough expressive power 
to even state this version of the problem. Among theories that can state it, there would 
seem to be several options. Clearly, one solution is to deny that default conclusions 
are closed under arbitrary conjunction, i.e., to give up on the And rule. But aside 
from explicitly probabilistic theories, we are not aware of work taking this approach 
(although the existence of multiple extensions in theories such as Reiter’s is certainly 
related). Without logical closure, there is a danger of being too dependent on merely 
syntactic features of a problem. Another solution is to prevent a theory from reasoning 
about all N individuals at once [ 171. Finally, one can simply deny that TWinner(c) 
follows by default. Circumscription, for instance, does this: the standard representation 
of the problem would result in multiple extensions, such that for each individual c, there 
is one extension where c is the winner. While this seems reasonable, circumscription 
only allows us to conclude things that hold in all extensions; thus, we would not be 
able to conclude TWinner(c). The problem with these “solutions” is that the lottery 
problem seems to be an extremely reasonable application of default reasoning: if you 
buy a lottery ticket you should continue your life under the assumption that you will 
not win. 
Second, a closely related issue is raised by Lifschitz’s list of benchmark problems 
[48]. Suppose we have a default, for instance Ticket(x) + TWinner(x), and no other 
knowledge. Should Vx( Ticket( x) =+ 7 Winner(x) be a default conclusion? Likewise, if 
we know Winner(c) but consider it possible that the lottery has more than one winner, 
should we nevertheless conclude that Vx( (Ticket(x) A x # c) =+ lWinner( x))? In 
circumscription, although not in many other theories, we get both universal conclusions 
(as Lifschitz argues for). The desire for these universal conclusions is certainly con- 
troversial; in fact it seems that we often expect default rules to have some exceptions. 
However, as Lifschitz observes, there is a technical difficulty in following this latter intu- 
ition: how can we conclude from the default Ticket(x) 4 ~Winner(x) that, by default, 
each individual c is not a winner, and yet not also reach the universal conclusion that, by 
default, no one wins? The concern is that, in many systems, the latter conclusion will be 
logically entailed whether we wish it or not. Because of its treatment of open defaults, 
Reiter’s default logic does not suffer from this difficulty. As we shall see, neither does 
the random-worlds approach. 
Finally, Poole [ 631 has considered a variant of the lottery paradox that avoids entirely 
the issue of named individuals. In his version, there is a formula describing the types of 
birds we are likely to encounter, such as: 
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Vx(Bird(x) ++ (Emu(x) VPenguin(x) V~~~VCunary(x))). 
We then add to the knowledge base defaults such as birds typically fly, but penguins 
typically do not fly, and we similarly assert that every other species of bird is excep- 
tional in some way. Now suppose all we know is that Bird( Tweety). Can we conclude 
that Tweety flies? If we conclude that he can, then a similar argument would also 
allow us to conclude that he is a typical bird in all other respects. But this would 
contradict the fact he must be exceptional in some respect. If we do not conclude that 
Tweety flies, then the default “Birds typically fly” has been effectively ignored. Poole 
uses such examples to give an exhaustive analysis of how various systems might re- 
act to the lottery paradox. He shows that in any theory, some desideratum, such as 
closure under conjunction or “conditioning” (Direct Inference for Defaults), must be 
sacrificed. Perhaps the most interesting “way out” he discusses is the possibility of 
declaring that certain combinations of defaults are inadmissible or inconsistent. Is it 
really reasonable to say that the class of birds is the union of subclasses all of which 
are exceptional? In many theories, such as Reiter’s default logic, there is nothing to 
prevent one from asserting this. But in a theory which gives reasonable semantics to 
defaults, we may be able to determine and justify the incompatibility of certain sets 
of defaults. This, indeed, is how our approach avoids Poole’s version of the lottery 
paradox. 
3.6. Discussion 
In this section, we have presented a limited list of desiderata that seem appropriate 
for a default reasoning system, and have discussed some key problems and issues that 
must be resolved by such a system. While our list may be limited, it is interesting 
to point out that there does not seem to be a single default reasoning system that 
fulfills all these desiderata in a satisfactory way. Although we can (and do) show that 
random worlds does, in fact, achieve all the requirements on this list, we would like to 
validate random worlds in a more comprehensive fashion. Unfortunately, to the best of 
our knowledge, there is (as yet) no general framework for evaluating default reasoning 
systems. In particular, evaluation still tends to be on the level of “Does this theory 
solve these particular examples correctly?” (see, for example, the list of benchmark 
problems in [ 481). While such examples are often important in identifying interesting 
aspects of the problem and defining our intuitions in these cases, they are clearly not a 
substitute for a comprehensive framework. Had there been such a framework, perhaps 
the drowning problem from Section 3.3 would not have remained undiscovered for so 
long. While we do not attempt to provide such a general framework in this paper, 
in Section 5 we prove a number of general theorems concerning the random-worlds 
approach. These theorems provide a precise formulation of properties such as Direct 
Inference for Defaults, and show that they hold for random worlds. Other properties 
such as specificity and exceptional subclass inheritance follow immediately from these 
theorems. Thus, our proof that the random-worlds approach deals well with the paradigm 
examples in default reasoning follows from a general theorem, rather than by a case-by- 
case analysis. 
4. The formalism 
4.1. The language 
We are interested 
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in a formal logical language that allows us to express both statistical 
information and first-order information. We therefore define a statistical language I?, 
which is a variant of a language designed by Bacchus [3]. For the remainder of the 
paper, let @ be a finite first-order vocabulary, consisting of predicate, function, and 
constant symbols, and let X be a set of variables. 
Our statistical language augments standard first-order logic with a form of statistical 
quantifier. For a formula $(x), the term ]]+(x)llX is a proportion expression. It will 
be interpreted as a rational number between 0 and 1, that represents the proportion of 
domain elements satisfying cl/(x). We actually allow an arbitrary set of variables in the 
subscript and in the formula (/I. Thus, for example, 1 IChild( x, y) 1 Ix describes, for a fixed 
y, the proportion of domain elements that are children of y; I IChild(x, y) I jy describes, 
for a fixed x, the proportion of domain elements whose child is x; and I I Child( x, y) 1 Ix,? 
describes the proportion of pairs of domain elements that are in the child relation. 
We also allow proportion expressions of the form I]$( x) 1 6J( x) JIx, which we call con- 
ditional proportion expressions. Such an expression is intended to denote the proportion 
of domain elements satisfying $ from among those elements satisfying 8. Finally, any ra- 
tional number is also considered to be a proportion expression, and the set of proportion 
expressions is closed under addition and multiplication. 
One important difference between our syntax and that of [ 31 is the use of approximate 
equality to compare proportion expressions. As we argued in the introduction, exact 
comparisons are sometimes inappropriate. Consider a statement such as “80% of patients 
with jaundice have hepatitis”. If this statement appears in a knowledge base, it is almost 
certainly there as a summary of a large pool of data. It is clear that we do not mean 
that exactly 80% of all patients with jaundice have hepatitis. Among other things, this 
would imply that the number of jaundiced patients is a multiple of five, which is surely 
not an intended implication. We therefore use the approach described in [ 28,381, and 
compare proportion expressions using (instead of = and <) one of an infinite family of 
connectives zi and di, for i = 1,2,3,. . . (“i-approximately equal” or “i-approximately 
less than or equal”). 8 For example, we can express the statement “80% of jaundiced 
patients have hepatitis” by the proportion formula lIHep(x) I Jaun(x) [IX ~1 0.8. The 
intuition behind the semantics of approximate equality is that each comparison should 
be interpreted using some small tolerance factor to account for measurement error, 
sample variations, and so on. The appropriate tolerance will differ for various pieces 
of information, so our logic allows different subscripts on the “approximately equals” 
connectives. A formula such as [[Fly(x) ) Bird(x)II, XI 1 A IIFly(x) 1 Bat(x)II, ~2 1 
says that both ]]Fly(x) ( Bird(x)II, and (IF/y(x) ) Bat(x)II, are approximately 1, but 
the notion of “approximately” may be different in each case. 
We can now give a recursive definition of the language C=. 
8 In 141 the use of approximate equality was suppressed in order to highlight other issues. 
96 E Bucchus et al./Ardjkial Inrelligence 87 (1996) 75-143 
Definition 4.1. The set of terms in Lc” is the least set containing X and the constant 
symbols in @ that is closed under function application (so that if f is a function symbol 
in 9 of arity r, and rt , . , t, are terms, then so is f(tt , . . . , t,)). 
The set of proportion expressions is the least set that 
(a) contains the rational numbers, 
(b) contains proportion terms of the form II@llx and [Ifi IOjlx, for formulas rJ,e E 
C” and a finite set of variables X 2 X, and 
(c) is closed under addition and multiplication. 
The set of formulas in C” is the least set that 
(a) contains atomic formulas of the form R( tl, . . . , tr), where R is a predicate 
symbol in @U {=} of arity r and tl, . . , t, are terms, 
(b) contains proportion formulas of the form 5 zi 5’ and C di l’, where C and l’ 
are proportion expressions and i is a natural number, and 
(c) is closed under conjunction, negation, and first-order quantification. 
Notice that this definition allows arbitrary nesting of quantifiers and proportion ex- 
pressions. In Section 4.3 we demonstrate the expressive power of the language. As 
observed in [ 31, the appearance of a variable x in the subscript of a proportion expres- 
sion binds the variable x in the expression; indeed, we can view Il.llx as a new type of 
quantification. 
We now need to define the semantics of the logic. As we shall see below, most 
of the definitions are fairly straightforward. The two features that cause problems are 
approximate comparisons and conditional proportion expressions. We interpret the ap- 
proximate connective 5 Ei 5’ to mean that f is very close to 5’. More precisely, it 
is within some very small, but unknown, tolerance factor. We formalize this using a 
tolerance vector 7’ = (q,r2,. . .), 7; > 0. Intuitively 5 Mi 5’ if the values of JJ and 5’ 
are within ri of each other. (Note that, although the use of tolerance vectors leads to 
well-defined formal semantics, one might object that in practice we generally will not 
know appropriate tolerance values. We defer our response to this objection to the next 
section.) 
A difficulty arises when interpreting conditional proportion expressions because we 
need to deal with the problem of conditioning on an event of measure 0. That is, 
we need to define semantics for II@ I 611 x even when there are no assignments to 
the variables in X that would satisfy B. When standard equality is used rather than 
approximate equality, this problem is easily overcome. Following [ 301, we can eliminate 
conditional proportion expressions altogether by viewing a statement such as ll$ I O/lx = 
a as an abbreviation for II+ A ~91 Ix = al(0l[x. This approach agrees with the standard 
interpretation of conditionals if llt9llx # 0. If l/e/lx = 0, it enforces the convention 
that formulas such as I[$ I Bllx = a or lit,!? ( 011 x < (Y are true for any CY. We used the 
same approach in [28], where we allowed approximate equality. Unfortunately, as the 
following example shows, this interpretation of conditional proportions can interact in 
an undesirable way with the semantics of approximate comparisons. In particular, this 
approach does not preserve the standard semantics of conditional equality if llellx is 
approximately 0. 
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Example 4.2. Consider the knowledge base: 9 
KB = ( 1 IPenguin ) IX XI 0) A (IIFly(x) I Penguin(x) IIx =2 0). 
97 
We expect this to mean that the proportion of penguins is very small (arbitrarily close 
to 0 in large domains), but also that the proportion of fliers among penguins is also very 
small. However, if we attempt to interpret conditional proportions as discussed above, 
we obtain the knowledge base 
KB’= (IIPenguin(x)II, ~1 0) A 
(IIW(x) APewWx)ll, z2 0’ IIPenguin(x)II,), 
which is equivalent to 
(IIPenguin(x)II. =I 0) A (IIFly(x) APenguin(x)II, x2 0). 
This last formula simply asserts that the proportion of penguins and the proportion of 
flying penguins are both small, but says nothing about the proportion of fliers among 
penguins. In fact, the world where all penguins fly is consistent with KB’. Clearly, 
the process of multiplying out across an approximate connective does not preserve the 
intended interpretation of the formulas. 
Because of this problem, we cannot treat conditional proportions as abbreviations and 
instead have added them as primitive expressions in the language. Of course, we now 
have to give them a semantics that avoids the problem illustrated by Example 4.2. We 
would like to maintain the conventions used when we had equality in the language. 
Namely, in worlds where Il8(x) )IX # 0, we want I/q(x) 1 t!?(x) [Ix to denote the fraction 
of elements satisfying e(x) that also satisfy p(x). In worlds where llO(x)llX = 0, we 
want all formulas of the form Ilp(x> I 13(x> /Ix xi a or 11+$x> I 0(x)11, di LY to be true. 
There are a number of ways of accomplishing this. The route we take is perhaps not 
the simplest, but it introduces machinery that will be helpful later. 
We give semantics to the language J!? by providing a translation from formulas in Lc” 
to formulas in a language L= whose semantics is more easily described. The language 
L= is essentially the language of [30], that uses true equality rather than approximate 
equality. More precisely, the definition of L= is identical to the definition of Lx given 
in Definition 4.1, except that: 
l we use = and < instead of zi and i,, 
l we allow the set of proportion expressions to include arbitrary real numbers (not 
just rational numbers), 
l we do not allow conditional proportion expressions, 
l we assume that Cc= has a special family of variables ei, interpreted over the reals. 
As we shall see, the variable ei is used to interpret the approximate equality connectives 
xi and ii. We view an expression in Lc= that uses conditional proportion expressions as 
an abbreviation for the expression obtained by multiplying out. 
9 We remark that, here and in our examples below, the actual choice of subscript for x is unimportant. 
However, we use different subscripts for different approximate comparisons unless the tolerances for the 
different measurements are known to be the same. 
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The semantics for LX is quite straightforward, and follows the lines of [30]. Recall 
that we give semantics to &= in terms of worlds, or finite first-order models. For any 
natural number IV, let W,+,(G) consist of all worlds with domain D = { I,. . . , N) over 
the vocabulary Cp. 
Now, consider a world W E WN( @I, a valuation V : X -+ { 1, . , N} for the 
variables in X, and a tolerance vector ?. We simultaneously assign to each proportion 
expression 3 a real number [ [ 1 (w,,!g and to each formula 4 a truth value with respect 
to (M! L!?). Most of the clauses of the definition are completely standard, so we omit 
them here. In particular, variables are interpreted using V, each tolerance variable F, 
is interpreted as denoting the tolerance r,, the predicates and constants are interpreted 
using W, the Boolean connectives and the first-order quantifiers are defined in the stan- 
dard fashion, and when interpreting proportion expressions, the real numbers, addition, 
multiplication, and < are given their standard meaning. It remains to interpret propor- 
tion terms. Recall that we eliminate conditional proportion terms by multiplying out, so 
that we need to deal only with unconditional proportion terms. If i is the proportion 
expression ]]fillX ,,..... l,L (for ii < i2 < < ix), then 
Thus, if W E W,(G), the proportion expression II$]/+ ..,x,k denotes the fraction of 
the Nk k-tuples of domain elements in D that satisfy ~4 in the world W. For exam- 
ple, [lIC~~i~~(x,~)ll.l~~!~~ is the fraction of domain elements d that are children of 
V(Y). 
We now show how a formula x E C= can be associated with a formula x* E C=. 
We proceed as follows: 
l every proportion formula i 3, [’ in x is (recursively) replaced by 5 - l’ 6 
0 Zery proportion formula IJ k+ 5’ in x t IS recursively) replaced by the conjunction ( 
(< - 5’ < Gil A (5’ - 5 < &;I, 
l finally, conditional proportion expressions are eliminated as in [301’s semantics, 
by multiplying out. 
This translation allows us to embed Lc” in C=. Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we 
regard Lx as a sublanguage of C=. We can now easily define the semantics of formulas 
in C”: for x E Lx. we say that ( W, Y?) /= ,y iff (W; Y?) k x*. It is sometimes useful 
to incorporate particular values for the tolerances into the formula x*. Thus, let x[fl 
represent the formula that results from x* if each variable E; is replaced by ri, its value 
according to 7: lo 
Typically we are interested in closed sentences, that is, formulas with no free variables. 
In that case, it is not hard to show that the valuation plays no role. Thus, if x is closed, 
we write (M! ?) /= x rather than ( W, K?) /= ,y. 
“‘Note that some of the tolerances 7, may be irrational; it is for this reason that we allowed arbitrary real 
numbers in the proportion expressions of C=. 
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4.2. Degrees of belief 
As we explained in the introduction, we give semantics to degrees of belief by 
considering all worlds of size N to be equally likely, conditioning on KB, and then 
checking the probability of 4p over the resulting probability distribution. In the previous 
section, we defined what it means for a sentence x to be satisfied in a world of size N 
using a tolerance vector 7’. Given N and +‘, we define # world&(x) to be the number 
of worlds in W,v( @) such that ( W, 73 + x. Since we are taking all worlds to be equally 
likely, the degree of belief in rp given KB with respect to WN and 7’ is 
Pr$(cp 1 KB) = 
# worlds; (rp A KB) 
# worldsc( KB) ’ 
If # worlds$( KB) = 0, this degree of belief is not well defined. ” 
Typically, we know neither N nor 7’ exactly. All we know is that N is “large” and 
that 7’ is “small”. Thus, we would like to take our degree of belief in (p given KB 
to be limi+a limN_+, Prk(4p ) KB). Notice that the order of the two limits over 7’ 
and N is important. If the limit lim,+G appeared last, then we would gain nothing by 
using approximate equality, since the result would be equivalent to treating approximate 
equality as exact equality. 
This definition, however, is not sufficient; the limit may not exist. We observed above 
that Prz(cp 1 KB) is not always well defined. In particular, it may be the case that for 
certain values of 7’, Prg ( C,O ) KB) is not well defined for arbitrarily large N. In order 
to deal with this problem of well definedness, we define KB to be eventually consistent 
if for all sufficiently small 7’ and sufficiently large N, # worldsiN > 0. Among 
other things, eventual consistency implies that the KB is satisfiable in finite domains 
of arbitrarily large size. For example, a KB stating that “there are exactly 7 domain 
elements” is not eventually consistent. I2 For the remainder of the paper, we assume 
that all knowledge bases are eventually consistent. 
Even if KB is eventually consistent, the limit may not exist. For example, it may be 
the case that for some i, Pri( v, 1 KB) oscillates between LY + ri and (Y - Ti as N gets 
large. In this case, for any particular 7’, the limit as N grows will not exist. However, it 
seems as if the limit as 7’ grows small “should”, in this case, be (Y, since the oscillations 
about CY go to 0. We avoid such problems by considering the limsup and liminf, rather 
than the limit. For any set S c R, the infimum of S, infS, is the greatest lower bound 
of S. The liminf of a sequence is the limit of the infimums; that is, 
lim inf uN = 
N-CC 
$mminf(ai: i > N}. 
I* Strictly speaking, we should write # worlds”,.’ (,y) rather than # worlds; (,y), since the number also depends 
on the choice of @. Indeed, we do so in the one place where this dependence matters (Theorem 5.27). The 
degree of belief is, however unaffected by expansions of the vocabulary. That is, if @’ > @ then the degree 
of belief Pri(9 1 KB) is the same under the vocabulary @’ as it is under @. 
I2 Of course, in this case one probably would not want to consider lim N - co anyway. If we are fortunate 
enough to know the domain size, and it is reasonably small, we can simply compute degrees of belief using 
the (known) fixed value of N. 
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The liminf exists for any sequence bounded from below, even if the limit does not. 
The limsup is defined analogously, where sups denotes the least upper bound of S. 
If limhr,, UN does exist, then IimN,, UN = lim inf,,, UN = lim supN+oo UN. Since, 
for any ?, the sequence PrL(sp ( KB) is always bounded from above and below, the 
limsup and liminf always exist. Thus, we do not have to worry about the problem 
of nonexistence for particular values of 7: We can now present the final form of our 
definition. 
Definition 4.3. If 
lim. liminfPr$(p / KB) and lim limsupPr$(Ip / KB) 
i-0 N-m i-6 N-m 
both exist and are equal, then the degree of belief in (o given KB, written Pr, ((p 1 KB), 
is defined as the common limit; otherwise Pr,(p 1 KB) does not exist. 
We point out that, even using this definition, there are many cases where the degree 
of belief does not exist. However, as some of our examples show, in many situations 
the nonexistence of a degree of belief can be understood intuitively, and is sometimes 
related to the existence of multiple extensions of a default theory. (See Sections 4.3 
and 5.3 and [ 281.) 
We remark that Shastri [ 7 I] used a somewhat similar approach to defining degrees 
of belief. His language does not allow the direct expression of statistical information, 
but does allow us to talk about the number of domain individuals that satisfy a given 
predicate. He then gives a definition of degree of belief similar to ours. Since he has no 
notion of approximate equality in his language, and presumes a fixed domain size (an 
assumption we wish to avoid), he does not have to deal with limits as we do. 
4.3. Statistical interpretation for defaults 
As we mentioned in the introduction, there are many similarities between direct infer- 
ence from statistical information and default reasoning. To capitalize on this observation, 
and to be able to use random worlds as a default reasoning system, we need to interpret 
defaults as statistical statements. However, finding the appropriate statistical interpre- 
tation is not straightforward. For example, as is well known, if we interpret “Birds 
typically fly” as “Most (i.e., more than 50% of) birds fly”, then we get a default system 
that fails to satisfy some of the most basic desiderata, such as the And rule, discussed 
in Section 3.2. Using a higher fixed threshold in a straightforward way does not help. 
More successfully, Adams [ I 1, and later Geffner and Pearl [ 201, suggested an interpre- 
tation of defaults based on “almost all”. In their framework, this is done using extreme 
probabilities-conditional probabilities that are arbitrarily close to 1: i.e., within 1 - E 
for some E, and considering the limit as E --f 0. The basic system derived from this idea 
is called e-semantics. Later, stronger systems (that are able to make more inferences) 
based on the same probabilistic idea were introduced (see Pearl [ 591 for a survey). 
The intuition behind E-semantics and its extensions seems to be statistical. However, 
since the language used in these approaches is propositional, this intuition cannot be 
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expressed directly. Indeed, these approaches typically make no distinction between the 
statistical nature of the default and the degree of belief nature of the default conclusion. 
We are able to capture this intuition more directly in our approach, since we can make 
this distinction explicitly. Recall that we interpret a statement such as “Birds typically 
fly” statistically, using the approximate statement \]Fly(x) 1 Binf(x)\I, xi 1 for some i. 
(Thus, the use of an approximate connective to compare proportion expressions is not 
purely a technical convenience.) Clearly, we can view our statistical interpretation of 
defaults as a generalization of the extreme probabilities interpretation of defaults to the 
first-order case. The connection between our work and e-semantics extends beyond the 
issue of representation: there is a deeper sense in which we can view our approach as 
the generalization of one of the extensions of e-semantics, namely the maximum-entropy 
approach of Goldszmidt, Morris, and Pearl [23], to the first-order setting. This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Section 6, where it is shown that this maximum-entropy 
approach can be embedded in our framework. 
Of course, the fact that our syntax is so rich allows us to express a great deal of 
information that simply cannot be expressed in any propositional approach. We observed 
earlier that a propositional approach that distinguishes between default knowledge and 
contextual knowledge has difficulty in dealing with the elephant-zookeeper example (see 
Section 3.4). This example is easily dealt with in our framework. 
Example 4.4. The following knowledge base, KB likes, is a formalization of the elephant- 
zookeeper example. Recall, this problem concerns the defaults that (a) elephants typi- 
cally like zookeepers, but (b) elephants typically do not like Fred. As discussed earlier, 
simply expressing this knowledge can be a challenge. In our framework this example 
can be expressed as follows: 
]]likes(x, y) ( Elephant(x) A Zookeeper(y)ll.,, q 1 A 
]llikes( x, Fred) 1 Elephant(x) IIx ~2 0 A 
Zookeeper( Fred) A Elephant( Clyde) A Zookeeper( Eric). 
Furthermore, our interpretation of defaults allows us to deal well with interactions 
between first-order quantifiers and defaults. 
Example 4.5. We may know that people who have at least one tall parent are typically 
tall. This default can be expressed in our language: 
[(Tall(x) I3y (Child(x,y) A Tall(y))ll, xi 1. 
We can also define defaults over classes themselves defined using default rules (as 
discussed by Morreau [56]). 
Example 4.6. In Section 3.4, we discussed the problem of expressing the nested 
default “Typically, people who normally go to bed late normally rise late”. To ex- 
press this default we can simply use nested proportion statements: the individuals 
who normally rise late are those who rise late most days; they are the x’s satisfy- 
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ing IIRises-la&(x, y) 1 Day(y) IIY MI 1. Similarly, the individuals who normally go to 
bed late are the x’s satisfying /[To-bed-Zute(x, y’) 1 Duy(y’) II,.! ~2 1. Thus we can cap- 
ture the default by saying most x’s that go to bed late also rise late, as in the knowledge 
base KBlute: 
II 
/[Rises-late(x, y) I Day(y) II?. = I 1 / I/To-bed-lute( x, y’) I Duy( y’) IIYf “2 1 .~ z3 I. 
!I 
On the other hand, the related default that “Typically, people who go to bed late rise 
late (i.e., the next morning)” can be expressed as: 
I/Rises-lute(x,Next-day(y) 1 / Day(y) A Ta-bed-lute(n,y)ll.,?. %:I 1, 
which is clearly different from the first default. 
5. Properties of random worlds 
We now show that the random-worlds method validates several desirable reasoning 
patterns, including essentially all of those discussed in Sections 2 and 3. It is worth noting 
that all of these reasoning patterns follow from the basic definition of the random-worlds 
method given in Section 4.2; none of these patterns require any additional structure to 
be added to the method. We also note that all the results in this section hold for our 
language in its full generality: the formulas can contain arbitrary function and predicate 
symbols (including nonunary predicates), and have nested quantifiers and proportion 
statements. Finally, we note that the theorems we state are not the most general ones 
possible. It is quite easy to construct examples for which the conditions of the theorems 
do not hold, but random worlds still gives the intuitively plausible answer. We could find 
theorems that deal with additional cases, although it seems to be fairly difficult to find 
other results whose conditions are easy to state and check, and yet cover an interestingly 
large class of examples. We discuss this issue again in Section 7.4. 
5.1. Rundom worlds and default reasoning 
In this subsection, we focus on formulas which are assigned degree of belief 1. Given 
any knowledge base KB (which can, in particular, include defaults using the statistical 
interpretation of Section 4.3), we say that p is a default conclusion from KB, and write 
KB i_,, cp, if Pr,( 9 I KB) = 1. As we now show, the relation k-, satisfies all the 
basic properties of default inference discussed in Section 3.2. We start by proving two 
somewhat more general results. 
Proposition 5.1. If /= KB u KB’, then Pr,(p I KB) = Pr,(p I KB’) for a~lformulas 
cp. '3 
I3 By Pr,( cp ( KB) = F’r,( cp ( KB’) we man that either both degrees of belief exist and have the same 
value, or neither exists. Proposition 5.2 should be interpreted analogously. 
E Bacchus et al./Artifcial Intelligence 87 (1996) 75-143 103 
Proof. By assumption, precisely the same set of worlds satisfy KB and KB’. Therefore, 
for all N and 7’, Pr; (p 1 KB) and Pr; (sp 1 KB’) are equal. Therefore, the limits are also 
equal. 0 
Proposition 5.2. If KB t-, 8, then Pr, ( (P I KB) = Pr, (cp 1 KB * 0) for any rP. 
Proof. Fix N and 7’. Then, by the standard properties of conditional probability, we get 
By assumption, P&(8 ( KB) tends to 1 when we take limits, so the first summand tends 
to Pr, (q ( KB A 0). Since Pr;( -49 1 KB) has limit 0 and Prz( 50 I KB A 4) is bounded, 
the second summand tends to 0. The result follows. Cl 
Theorem 5.3. The relation b, satisjes the properties of And, Cautious Monotonic@, 
Cut, Left Logical Equivalence, Or, Reflexivity, and Right Weakening. 
Proof. 
And: As we mentioned in Section 3.2, this follows from the other properties proved 
below. 
Cautious Monotonicity and Cut: These follow immediately from Proposition 5.2. 
Left Logical Equivalence: Follows immediately from Proposition 5.1. 
Or: Assume Pr,(4p ( KB) = Pr,(rp I KB’) = 1, so that Pr,(-cp 1 KB) = Pr,(lrp 1 
KB’) = 0. Fix N and ?. Then 
PrG(lp 1 KBV KB’) 
=Prc(ylpA(KBVKB’) I KBVKB’) 
<P~~(-~AKBIKBVKB’)+P~~(~YAKB’IKBVKB’) 
<Prc(Tq I KB) +Prg(lq I KB’). 
Taking limits, we conclude that Pr,( 79 I KB V KB’) = 0. It follows that (KB V 
KB’) t-, 4~. 
RefZexivity: Because we restrict our attention to KB’s that are eventually consistent, 
Pr, (KB I KB) is well defined. But then Pr, (KB I KB) is clearly equal to 1. 
Right Weakening: Suppose Pr,( 40 I KB) = 1. If k p + p’, then the set of worlds 
satisfying C$ is a superset of the set of worlds satisfying C,D. Therefore, for any N and ?, 
I$,( (p’ 1 KB) 2 Pr$ (40 ) KB) . Taking limits, we obtain that 
1 2 Pr,((p’ I KB) > Pr,(qp ) KB) = 1, 
and so necessarily Pr, (40’ ( KB) = 1. Cl 
Besides demonstrating that k,.,,, satisfies the minimal standards of reasonableness for 
a default inference relation, these properties, particularly the stronger form of Cut and 
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Cautious Monotonicity proved in Proposition 5.2, will prove quite useful in computing 
degrees of belief, especially when combined with some other properties we prove below 
(see also Section 7.4). In particular, many of our later results show how random 
worlds behaves for knowledge bases and queries that have certain restricted forms. 
Sometimes a KB that does not satisfy these requirements can be changed into one that 
does, simply by extending KB with some of its default conclusions. We then appeal to 
Proposition 5.2 to justify using the new knowledge base instead of the old one. The 
other rules are also useful, as shown in the following analysis of Poole’s “broken-arm” 
example [ 621. 
Example 5.4. Suppose we have predicates LeftUsable, LeftBroken, RightUsable, 
RightBroken, indicating, respectively, that the left arm is usable, the left arm is bro- 
ken, the right arm is usable, and the right arm is broken. Let KB:, consist of the 
statements 
l IlLeftUsable(x)/l, ~1 1, IILefUsable( x) I LeftBroken I(* M:! 0 (left arms are 
typically usable, but not if they are broken), 
l IIRightUsable(x)II, “3 1, IIRightUsable(x) ( RightBroken(x)(I, ~4 0 (right arms 
are typically usable, but not if they are broken). 
Now, consider KB,, = (KB&_,, A (LeftBroken (Eric) V RightBroken( Eric) ) ) ; that is, we 
know that Eric has a broken arm. Poole observes that if we use Reiter’s default logic, 
there is precisely one extension of KB,,, and in that extension, both arms are usable. 
However, it can be shown that 
KB:,,, A LeftBroken( Eric) bvnL. -LeftlJsable( Eric) 
(see Theorem 5.6 below) and hence (using right Weakening) that 
KB:,,, A LeftBroken( Eric) i_,.,,, TLeftUsable( Eric) V TRightUsable(Eric); 
the same conclusion is obtained from KB:,, A RightBroken(Eric). By the Or rule, it 
follows that 
K&r,,, F,, TLeftUsable( Eric) V TRightUsable( Eric). 
Using similar reasoning, we can also show that 
KB,,.,,, i_, LeftUsable( Eric) V RightUsable( Eric). 
By applying the And rule, we conclude by default from KB,, that exactly one of Eric’s 
arms is usable, but we draw no conclusions as to which one it is. 
The final property mentioned in Section 3.2 is Rational Monotonicity. Recall that 
Rational Monotonicity asserts that if KB b, p and KB p,,,, -8 then (KB A 19) b, p. 
Random worlds satisfies a weakened form of Rational Monotonicity. In particular, it 
satisfies Rational Monotonic&y except in those situations where limits fail to exist. I4 If 
Pr,( 40 I KB A 0) does exist it must be equal to I, i.e., we must have (KB A 0) k, 40 
I4 As we discuss later in Section 5.3 there arc often intuitive reasons for the nonexistence of limits. 
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as desired. Sometimes, however, this limit does not exist. Note that the assumption 
that KB t-, cp entails that Pr,( 4p 1 KB) exists. But Rational Monotonicity’s other 
assumption, that KB p, -4 holds if either Pr,(B ) KB) has a value less than one 
or if this degree of belief does not exist. It is the latter “incompatibility” of 8 with 
KB that is a potential source of problems. In this case the combination of KB and 0 
may fail to assign a limiting degree of belief to rp even though KB by itself did. The 
following theorem summarizes the status of Rational Monotonic@ in the random-worlds 
approach. 
Theorem 5.5. Assume that KB k,.,,, 4p and KB p, 4. Then KB A 0 k,.,,, 4p provided 
that Pr, (p 1 KB A 0) exists. Moreover, a s@cient condition for F’r,(q 1 KB A 0) to 
exist is that Pr, (8 1 KB) exists. 
Proof. Longer proofs, including the proof of this result, are in the Appendix. 0 
5.2. Specificity and inheritance in random worlds 
One way of using random worlds is to derive conclusions about particular individuals, 
based on general statistical knowledge. This is, of course, the type of reasoning reference- 
class theories were designed to deal with. Recall, these theories aim to discover a single 
piece of data-the statistics for a single reference class-that summarizes all the relevant 
information. This idea is also useful in default reasoning, where we sometimes want to 
find a single appropriate default. Random worlds rejects this idea as a general approach, 
but supports it as a valuable heuristic in special cases. 
In this section, we give two theorems covering some of the cases where random 
worlds agrees with the basic philosophy of reference classes. Both results concern 
spec$city-the idea of using the “smallest” relevant reference class for which we have 
statistics. However, both results also allow some indifference to irrelevant information. 
In particular, the second theorem also covers certain forms of inheritance (as described 
in Section 3.3). The results cover almost all of the noncontroversial pplications of 
specificity and inheritance that we are aware of, and do not seem to suffer from any of 
the commonly found problems uch as the disjunctive reference-class problem (see Sec- 
tion 2.2). Because our theorems are derived properties rather than postulates, consistency 
is assured and there are no ad hoc syntactic restrictions on the choice of possible refer- 
ence classes. We remark that Shastri [ 7 1 ] has also observed that irrelevance properties 
hold in his framework. 
Our first, and simpler, result is basic direct inference, where we have a single reference 
class that is precisely the “right one”. That is, assume that the assertion G(c) represents 
everything the knowledge base tells us about the constant c. In this case, we can view 
the class defined by #I(x) as the class of all individuals who are “just like c”. If we 
have adequate statistics for the class 9(x), then we should clearly use this information. 
For example, assume that all we know about Eric is that he exhibits jaundice, and let 
$ represent he class of patients with jaundice. If we know that 80% of patients with 
jaundice exhibit hepatitis, then basic direct inference would dictate a degree of belief 
of 0.8 in Eric having hepatitis. We would, in fact, like this to hold regardless of any 
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other information we might have in the knowledge base. For example, we may know 
the proportion of hepatitis among patients in general, or that patients with jaundice and 
fever typically have hepatitis. But if all we know about Eric is that he has jaundice, we 
would still like to use the statistics for the class of patients with jaundice, regardless of 
the additional information. 
Our result essentially asserts the following: “If we are interested in obtaining a degree 
of belief in q(c), and the KB is of the form 1+4(c) A I/q(x) 1 G(x) II* z LY A KB’, then 
conclude that Pr,(p(c) I KB) = a”. (Here, KB’ is simply intended to denote the rest 
of KB, whatever it may be.) Clearly, in order for the result to hold, we must make 
certain assumptions. The assumptions we consider can be viewed as ensuring that e(c) 
represents all the information we have about c. First, for obvious reasons, we require that 
KB’ does not mention c. However, this is not enough; we also need to assume that c does 
not appear in either q(x) or $(x) To understand why c cannot appear in p(x), suppose 
that p(x) is Q(x) V x = c, +4(x) is true, and the KB is 119(x) I truell, =I 0.5. If the 
result held in this case, we would erroneously conclude that Pr, ((o( c) I KB) = 0.5. But 
since p(c) holds tautologically, we actually obtain Pr,(qo(c) I KB) = 1. To see why 
the constant c cannot appear in $(x), suppose that $(x) is (P(x) A x # c) V-P(x), 
q(x) is P(X), and the KB is e(c) A I/P(x) / cc/(x)llX z:2 0.5. Again, if the result held, 
we would be able to conclude that Pr,( P(c) / KB) = 0.5. But +9(c) is equivalent to 
-P(c), so in fact Pr,(P(c) ( KB) = 0. 
As we now show, these assumptions suffice to guarantee the desired result. In fact, 
the theorem generalizes the basic principle to properties and classes dealing with more 
than one individual at a time (as is demonstrated in some of the examples following the 
theorem). In the following, let x’= {xl,. . , xk} and c’= {cl,. . . , ck} be sets of distinct 
variables and distinct constants, respectively. Furthermore, we use ~(2) to indicate that 
all of the free variables in the formula 9 are in 2, and we use qo(c3 to denote the 
new formula formed by substituting each Xi by c; in p. Note that p may contain other 
constants not among the ci’s; these are unaffected by the substitution. 
Theorem 5.6. Let KB be a knowledge buse of the form @(a A KB’, and assume that 
for all suficiently small tolerance vectors 7’, 
If no constant in c’ appears in KB’, in q(i), or in e(2), then Pr,(q(?‘) I KB) E 
[a, p] , provided the degree of belief exists. Is 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
Theorem 5.6 refers to any statistical information about (lqo(x’) 1 +4(x’) 117 that can be 
inferred from the knowledge base. An important special case is when the knowledge 
base contains the relevant information explicitly. 
I5 The degree of belief may not exist since lim,~lim inf,,,_m PrL(p / KB) may not be equal to 
limi_G lim SU~~_~ Pri (~0 1 KB). However, it follows from the proof of the theorem that both these limits 
lie in the interval [a, 81. A similar remark holds for many of our later results. 
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Corollary 5.7. Let KB’ be the conjunction 
rl/(c3 A (Q! 5i ll9(3 I +(3ll? ij P) . 
Let KB be a knowledge base of the form KB’ A KB” such that no constant in c’appears 
in KB”, in cp( 2) , or in 1//( 2). Then, if the degree of belief exists, we have 
Pr,(so(c’) I KB) E [a,Pl. 
Proof. Let E > 0, and let 7’be sufficiently small so that Ti, rj < E. For this ?, the formula 
(a 3; (\~(a I G(Z) 11~ 3.i P) implies 11dx3 I fiC.3 11~ E [a - E, p + ~1. Therefore, by 
Theorem 5.6, Pr, (p( ?) I KB) E [a - E, p + E] . But since this holds for any E > 0, it 
is necessarily the case that Pr,( p( Z) I KB) E [a, p] . 0 
It is interesting to note one way in which this result diverges from the reference-class 
paradigm. Suppose we consider a query p(c), and that our knowledge base KB is as 
in the hypothesis of Corollary 5.7. While we can indeed conclude that Pr,(cp(Z) 1 
KB) E [a, /3], the exact value of the degree of belief within this interval depends 
on the other information in the knowledge base. Thus, while random worlds certainly 
uses the information LY <i lip(x) I $(x)I(, $ p, it does not necessarily ignore the 
rest of the knowledge base altogether. On the other hand, if the interval [ a,P] is 
sufficiently small (and, in particular, when (Y = p), then we may not care exactly where 
in the interval the degree of belief lies. In this case, we can ignore all the information 
in KB’, and use the single piece of “local” information for computing the degree of 
belief. 
We now present a number of examples that demonstrate the behavior of the direct 
inference result. 
Example 5.8. Consider a knowledge base describing the hepatitis example discussed 
earlier. In the notation of Corollary 5.7: 
K&p = Jaun(Eric) A IIHep(x) 1 Jaun(x) IIx XI 0.8, 
and 
KBhr,, = KBL, A IJHep(x)ll, 52 0.05 A l(Hep(x) I Jaun(x) AFever(x)ll. x:! 1. 
Then Pr,(Hep(Eric) I KBhep) = 0.8 as desired; information about other reference 
classes (whether more general or more specific) is ignored. Other kinds of information 
are also ignored, for example, information about other individuals. Thus, 
Pr,(Hep(Eric) I K&, A Hep(Tom)) = 0.8. 
Although it is nothing but an immediate application of Theorem 5.6, it is worth 
remarking that the principle of Direct Inference for Defaults (Section 3.3) is satisfied 
by random worlds: 
Corollary 5.9. Suppose KB implies I(q( 2) ( (/I (2) 112 Xi 1, and no constant in c’appears 
in KB, rp, or +. Then Pr,((p(c?) I KB A$(c?)) = 1. 
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As discussed in Section 3.3, this shows that simple forms of reasoning about classi- 
fication hierarchies are possible. 
Example 5.10. The knowledge base KBpI,. from Section 3.3 is, under our interpretation 
of defaults: 
IIFfy / Bird(x)/(, =I 1 A 
II/+(X) 1 Penguins/, x2 0 A 
‘v’x( Penguin(x) + Bird(x) 1. 
Then Pr,(F1y( Tweets) 1 KBJ! A fenguirz( Tweery) ) = 0. That is, we conclude that 
Tweety the penguin does not fly, even though he is also a bird and birds generally do 
fly. 
Given this preference for the most specific reference class, one might wonder why 
random worlds does not encounter the problem of disjunctive reference classes (see 
Section 2.2). The following example, based on the example from Section 2.2, provides 
one answer. 
Example 5.11. Recall the knowledge base KB&,, from the hepatitis example above, 
and consider the disjunctive reference class 
Clearly, as the domain size grows large, lIHep(x) / e(x) /Ix becomes arbitrarily close to 
0. t6 Therefore, for any fixed E > 0, 
Pr,(l/Hep(x) / G(X) IIA E [O-E] 1 K%p) = 1. 
We can construct a new knowledge base 
KB v/7efp = KBj,,, A IIHep(x) / @I(x) II.r E lk~l. 
Furthermore, KBvt,,,, /== I++( Eric). Hence, KBv/,,,, contains a more specific reference 
class for Hep(Eric) than Jaw(x) with very different statistics. Yet, by Proposition 5.2, 
we know that Pr,( Hep( Eric) / KB&,) = Pr,( Hep(Eric) / KBvhcp), and in Exam- 
ple 5.8 we showed this to be equal to 0.8. So random worlds avoids using the spurious 
disjunctive class $(x) even in a knowledge base that explicitly includes statistics from 
this class. Theorem 5.6 does not apply here because the class cl/(x) explicitly men- 
tions the constant Eric. Another way of seeing that the class G(x) does not affect the 
random-worlds computation is to observe that its statistics are not informative, i.e., these 
statistics are true in almost all worlds. Hence $(x)‘s statistics places no constraints on 
the sets of worlds that determine the degree of belief. As we shall see in Example 5.22, 
I6 This actually relies on the fact that, with high probability, the proportion (as the domain size grows) of 
jaundiced patients without hepatitis is nonzero. We do not prove this fact here; see 126.57 1. 
E Bacchus et al./Artificial Intelligence 87 (I 996) 75-143 109 
when we do have informative statistics for a class, those statistics can be used, even if 
the class is disjunctive. 
As we have said, we are not limited to unary predicates, nor to examining only one 
individual at a time. 
Example 5.12. In Example 4.4, we showed how to formalize the elephant-zookeeper 
example discussed in Section 3.4. As we now show, the natural representation of KBIikes 
indeed yields the answers we expect. We consider two queries. First, assume that we 
are interested in finding out whether Clyde likes Eric. In this case, we can use the class 
of pairs (cI(x, y) = Elephant(x) A Zookeeper( y). Applying Corollary 5.9 to the first 
default in KBlikes, we can conclude that Pr,(Likes( Clyde,Eric) 1 KBlikes) = 1. Second, 
we examine whether or not Clyde likes Fred. Applying Corollary 5.9 to the second 
default in KBlike,, we can conclude that Pr, (Likes (Clyde, Fred) 1 KBlikes) = 0. Note 
that we cannot apply Corollary 5.9 to the first default in KBlikes to conclude that Clyde 
likes Fred. The conditions of the corollary are violated, because the constant Fred is 
used elsewhere in the knowledge base. 
The same principles continue to hold for more complex sentences; for example, we 
can mix first-order logic and statistical knowledge arbitrarily and we can nest defaults. 
Example 5.13. In Example 4.5, we showed how to express the default: “People who 
have at least one tall parent are typically tall”. If we have this default, and also know 
that 3y (ChiZd(Alice, y) A Tall(y) ) (Alice has a tall parent), Corollary 5.9 tells us that 
we can conclude by default that Tall(AZice). 
Example 5.14. In Example 4.6, we showed how the default “Typically, people who 
normally go to bed late normally rise late” can be expressed in our language using the 
knowledge base KBrate. Let KBj,, be 
KB,,, A /ITo-bed-hte(Alice,y’) 1 Duy(y’)IIY~ ~2 1. 
By Corollary 5.9, Alice typically rises late. That is, 
Pr,( IIRises-lute(Alice, y) I Day(y) IIY xi 1 I KBj,,,) = 1. 
By Cautious Monotonicity and Cut, we can add this conclusion (which is itself a default) 
to KB;,,. By Corollary 5.9 again, we then conclude that Alice can be expected to rise 
late on any particular day, say Tomorrow. So, for instance: 
Pr, (Rises-Zute(Alice, Tomorrow) 1 KB$, A Duy( Tomorrow) > = 1. 
In all the examples presented so far in this section, we have statistics for precisely 
the right reference class to match our knowledge about the individual(s) in question; 
Theorem 5.6 and its corollaries require this. Unfortunately, in many cases our statistical 
information is not detailed enough for Theorem 5.6 to apply. Consider the knowledge 
base KBh, from the hepatitis example. Here we have statistics for the occurrence of 
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hepatitis among the class of patients who are just like Eric, so we can use these 
to induce a degree of belief in Hep(Eric). But now consider the knowledge base 
KB,,, A Tufl( Eric). Since we do not have statistics for the frequency of hepatitis among 
tall patients, the results we have seen so far do not apply. We would like to be able to 
ignore Td(Eric). But what entitles us to ignore Td(Eric) and not Jaun(Eric)‘? To 
solve this problem in complete generality requires a better theory of irrelevance than we 
currently have. Nevertheless, our next theorem covers many cases, including many of 
the less controversial examples found in the default reasoning literature. 
The theorem we present deals with a knowledge base KB that defines a “minimal” 
reference class $0 with respect to the query p(c). More precisely, assume that KB 
gives statistical information regarding /Ip( x) 1 ti;( x) jIx f or a number of different classes 
qi(x). Further suppose that, among these classes, there is one class &(x) that is 
minimal-all other classes are strictly larger or entirely disjoint from it. Our result 
states that if we also know @c(c), we can use the statistics for lisp(x) j $0(x) [Ix to 
induce a degree of belief in p(c). What makes this such an interesting result is that 
we are allowed to know 1?1o~e about c than just +e( c) ; any extra information will 
be treated as being irrelevant. This pattern of reasoning is best explained using an 
example: 
Example 5.15. Assume we have a knowledge base KBtrrxon,,,,lX containing information 
about birds and animals; in particular, KB,olo,lo,l,\. contains a taxonomic hierarchy of this 
domain. Moreover, KBt(lX,,,,,,m, contains the following information about the swimming 
ability of various types of animals: 
JjSwims( x) 1 Penguin(x) (I,, %I 0.9 A 
IlSwims( x) / Spari-ow( x) jl.r z2 0.0 I A 
&!hvims(x) I Bird(x)ll, zj 0.05 A 
IISwims(x) I Animal(x) 11, E=J 0.3 A 
~pvims(x) 1 Fish(x)//., =5 I. 
If we also know that Opus is a penguin, then in order to determine whether Opus swims 
the best reference class is surely the class of penguins. The remaining classes are either 
larger (in the case of birds or animals), or disjoint (in the case of sparrows and fish). 
This is the case even if we know that Opus is a black penguin with a large nose. That is, 
Opus inherits the statistics for the minimal class @o-penguins-even though the class 
of individuals just like Opus is smaller than Qe. 
That random worlds validates this intuition is formalized in the next theorem. This 
theorem requires that no symbol in (P(X) appear in the knowledge base other than 
in statistics of the form 119(x) / $(x) II* f or various $(x). This is necessary for our 
assumption of a unique minimal reference class to be a practical one. Suppose that, in 
violation of this condition, the knowledge base contains Vx(@(n) + (P(X)). Clearly 
$(.x) is in fact a reference class for r&x) (where the statistic is 100%). But if we 
identify reference classes only by looking for terms of the form Ill I $(x) IIX, we 
will not notice this. Obviously the minimality assumption needs to consider all reference 
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classes, irrespective of syntactic form. But because first-order logic provides many subtle 
and nonobvious ways to constrain statistics relating to rp( x), we simplify the issue by 
assuming that the only mention of information that might be related to p(x) is contained 
in explicit statistical assertions. Of course, it would be very interesting to find a result 
that addresses cases in which this assumption is not true. 
Theorem 5.16. Let c be a constant and let KB be a knowledge base satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(4 KB k fin, 
(b) for any expression of the form I]qp(x> 1 I)(X) IIx in KB, it is the case that either 
KB l= V.~$O(X) * ccl(x)) or that KB k W@O(X) * +(x) ), 
(c) the (predicate, function, and constant) symbols in p(x) appear in KB only on 
the left-hand side of the conditionals in the proportion expressions described in 
condition (b) , 
(d) the constant c does not appear in the formula cp( x). 
Assume that for all s@iciently small tolerance vectors 7’: 
KB[77 k 1140(x) I $otx)Ilx E [a,Pl. 
Then Pr, (cp( c) I KB) E [a, B] , provided the degree of belief exists. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
Again, the following analogue to Corollary 5.7 is immediate: 
Corollary 5.17. Let KB’ be the conjunction 
$O(c) A (a 5i IlP(X) I +O(X)llx 5j P). 
Let KB be a knowledge base of the form KB’ A KB” that satisfies conditions (b), (c), 
and (d) of Theorem 5.16. Then, if the degree of belief exists, 
Pr,(qo(c) I KB) E [a,Pl. 
This theorem and corollary have many useful applications. 
Example 5.18. Consider the knowledge bases KB& and KBt,, concerning jaundice 
and hepatitis from Example 5.8. In that example, we supposed that the only information 
about Eric contained in the knowledge base was that Eric has jaundice. It is clearly 
more realistic to assume that Eric’s hospital records contain more information than just 
this fact. Theorem 5.16 allows us to ignore this information in a large number of cases. 
For example, 
Pr, ( Hep ( Eric) I KBLeP A Fever( Eric) A Tall( Eric) ) = 0.8, 
as desired. On the other hand, 
Pr, ( Hep ( Eric) I KBt,, A Fever( Eric) A Tall( Eric) ) = 1. 
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(Recall that KBh, includes I[Hep(x) 1 Juun(x) A Fever(x) 11, ~2 1, while KB& does 
not.) This shows why it is important that we identify the most specific reference class 
for the query p. The most specific reference statistic for Hep(Eric) with respect to 
KB;,,,, A Fever(Eric) A Tall(Eric) is ((Hep(x) j Juun(x) (Ix z=] 0.8, while with respect 
to K&c,, A Fever(Eric) A Tull(Eric) it is IIHep(x) / Juun(x) A Fever(x) IIx ~2 1. In the 
latter case, the less specific reference classes Juun and true are ignored, and in both 
cases Theorem 5.16 allows us to ignore the extra information Tall(Eric). Note that the 
theorem does not allow us to conclude that 
Pr, (Hep( Eric) ( KBhr,, A Tall( Eric 1) = 0.8 
The class Juun is no longer the unique most specific reference class, since we also have 
statistics for the more specific class Juun A Fever. Nevertheless, this conclusion is, in 
fact, reached by random worlds. 
As discussed in Section 3.3, various inheritance properties are considered desirable in 
default reasoning as well. To begin with, we note that Theorem 5.16 covers the simpler 
cases (which can also be seen as applications of Rational Monotonicity) : 
Example 5.19. In simple cases, Theorem 5.16 shows that random worlds is able to apply 
defaults in the presence of “obviously irrelevant” additional information. For example, 
using the knowledge base KBfr? (see Example 5.10): 
Pr, ( HJ( Tweet)‘) / Kf3hY A Penguin( Tweety) A kllow( Tweety) ) = 0. 
That is, Tweety the yellow penguin is still not able to fly. 
Theorem 5.16 also validates more difficult reasoning patterns that have caused prob- 
lems for many default reasoning theories. In particular, we validate exceptional subclass 
inheritance, in which a class that is exceptional in one respect can nevertheless inherit 
other unrelated properties: 
Example 5.20. If we consider the property of warm-bloodedness as well as flight, we 
get: 
Pr, 
Wurm-blooded(Tweety) 
KBfY A Penguin( Tweety) A 
= ” Ij Warm-btooded(x) 1 Bird(x) III ~3 I 
Knowing that Tweety does not fly because he is a penguin does not prevent us from 
assuming that he is like typical birds in other respects. 
The drowning problem variant of the exceptional subclass inheritance problem is also 
covered by the theorem. 
Example 5.21. Suppose we know, as in Section 3.3, that yellow things tend to be highly 
visible. Then: 
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Pr, Easy-to-see( Tweety) 
KB~~Y A Penguin( Tweety) A Yellow( Tweety) A 
I(Easy-to-see(x) 1 Yelfow(x)ll. ~3 1 = 1. 
Here, all that matters is that Tweety is a yellow object. The fact that he is a bird, and 
an exceptional bird at that, is rightly ignored. 
Notice that, unlike Theorem 5.6, the conditions of Theorem 5.16 do not extend to 
inferring degrees of belief in q( c?), where c’ is a tuple of constants. Roughly speaking, 
the reason lies in the ability of the language to create connections between different 
constants in the tuple. For example, let KB’ be ] ]Hep( x) A +Zep(y) IIX,y MI 0.2. By 
Theorem 5.6 (taking $0 (xi, x2) to be true), Pr, (Hep( Tom) A-+Zep( Eric) ) KB’) = 0.2. 
But, of course, Pr,(Hep( Tom) A +lep(Eric) 1 KB’ A Tom = Eric) = 0. The additional 
information regarding Tom and Eric cannot be ignored. A version of Theorem 5.16 
where we replaced c by c’ would incorrectly attempt to ignore this information. This 
example might suggest that this is a problem related only to the use of equality, but 
more complex examples that do not mention equality can also be constructed. 
As a final example in this section, we revisit the issue of disjunctive reference classes. 
As we saw in Example 5.11, random worlds does not suffer from the “disjunctive 
reference-class” problem. In Section 2.2, we observed that some systems avoid this 
problem by simply outlawing disjunctive reference classes, which is problematic, as 
such classes are sometimes useful. The next example demonstrates that random worlds 
does, in fact, treat disjunctive reference classes appropriately. 
Example 5.22. Recall that in Section 2.2 we gave an example involving disjunctive 
reference classes for Tay-Sachs disease. The corresponding statistical information was 
represented, in our framework, as the knowledge base KB: 
/(TS( x) I EEJ(x) V K(x) IIX xl 0.02. 
Given a baby Eric of eastern-European extraction, Theorem 5.16 shows us that 
Pr, (TS( Eric) 1 KB A EEJ( Eric) ) = 0.02. 
That is, random worlds is able to use the information derived from the disjunctive ref- 
erence class, and apply it to an individual known to be in the class; indeed, through 
inheritance it also deals with the case where we have additional information determin- 
ing to which of the two populations this specific individual belongs. Thus, disjunctive 
reference classes are treated in the same manner as other potential reference classes. 
The type of specificity and inheritance reasoning covered by the results in this section 
are special cases of general inheritance reasoning. While these theorems show that 
random worlds does support many noncontroversial instances of such reasoning, proving 
a more general theorem asserting this claim is surprisingly subtle (partly because of 
the existence of numerous divergent semantics and intuitions for inheritance reasoning 
[ 721) . We are currently working towards stating and proving such a general claim, for 
the case in which we have an inheritance hierarchy of defaults and universal implications. 
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On the other hand, it is easy to see that random worlds does not validate general 
inheritance reasoning in an arbitrary statistical context (i.e., where some statistical 
values are less than 1, and so do not state defaults). We discuss why this happens 
below, in Example 5.25, and argue that we should not want simple inheritance in all 
contexts anyway. 
5.3. Competing reference classes 
In previous sections we have always been careful to consider examples in which 
there was an obviously “best” reference class. In practice, we will not always be this 
fortunate. Reference-class theories usually cannot give useful answers when there are 
competing candidates for the best class. However, random worlds does not have this 
problem, because the degrees of belief it defines can be combinations of the values for 
competing classes. In this section we examine, in very general terms, three types of 
competing information. The first concerns conflicts between specificity and accuracy, 
the second between information that is too specific and information that is too general, 
and the last between incomparable reference classes, so that the specificity principle is 
not applicable. 
We discussed the conflict between specificity and accuracy in Section 2.3. This prob- 
lem was noticed by Kyburg, who addresses this issue with his strength rule. In Sec- 
tion 2.3, we argued that, to assign a degree of belief to Chirps( Tweety), we should 
be able to use the tighter interval [0.7,0.8] even though it is associated with a less 
specific reference class. As we observed, Kyburg’s strength rule attempts to capture this 
intuition. As the following result shows, the random-worlds method also captures this 
intuition (without requiring any special rules), at least when the reference classes form 
a chain. ” 
Theorem 5.23. Suppose KB has the form 
x (a, 36, Ill I @ii(X)lIx 5r, pi, A@I CC) A KB’, 
i=l 
and, for all i, KB b ‘vx(I/J~(x) + ccl,+l(x)) /2 ~(ll+l(x)ll, ~1 0). Assume also that 
no symbol appearing in q(x) appears in KB’ or in any @i(c). Further suppose that, 
for some j, [ Cy.i, fl,j] is the tightest interval. That is, for all i # j, ai < ‘Yj < ei < p;. 
Then, if it exists, 
Pr,((p(c) / KB) E IQi,Pjl. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
” Kyburg’s rule also applies to cases where the reference classes do not form a chain. The random-worlds 
method disagrees with the strength rule in these cases. For example, if we know that only 20% of Republicans 
are pacifists, that only 20% of bankers are pacifists, and that Morgan is a Republican banker, Kyburg’s 
strength rule would conclude that our degree of belief that Morgan is a pacifist is 0.2. On the other hand, the 
random-worlds method would view this as two pieces of evidence counting against Morgan being a pacifist; 
it can be shown that this would result in a degree of belief less than 0.2. 
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Example 5.24. The example described in Section 2.3 is essentially captured by the 
following knowledge base KBchirps: 
0.7 51 [[Chirps(x) 1 Bird(x)I(, 52 0.8 A 
0 53 (IChirps I Magpie(x) Ilx 54 0.99 A 
Vx (Mugpie( x) + Bird(x) ) A 
Magpie( Tweety) . 
It follows from Theorem 5.23 that Pr, (Chirps( Tweety) ( KBchirps) E [0.7,0.8], I8 
Next, we consider a different way in which competing reference classes can arise: 
when one reference class is too specific, and the other too general. 
Example 5.25. We illustrate the problem with a example based on one of Goodwin’s 
[ 251. Consider KBmgpie: 
(IChirps ) Bird(x)lj, Ml 0.9 A 
IIChirps( x) 1 Magpie(x) A Mody( X) IIx ~2 0.2 A 
Vx (Mugpie( x) + Bird(x) ) A 
Magpie( Tweety) .
Reference-class theories would typically ignore the information about moody magpies: 
since Tweety is not known to be moody, the class of moody magpies is not even a 
legitimate reference class in these theories. Using such approaches, the degree of belief 
would be 0.9. Goodwin argues that this is not completely reasonable-why should we 
ignore the information about moody magpies? Tweety could be moody (the knowledge 
base leaves the question open). In fact, it is consistent with KBmgpie that magpies 
are generally moody. But ignoring the second statistic in effect amounts to assuming 
that magpies generally are not moody. It seems hard to see why this is a reasonable 
assumption. The random-worlds approach supports Goodwin’s intuition, and the degree 
of belief that Tweety flies, given KBnmg+ can be shown to have a value which is less 
than 0.9. 
This example illustrates a general phenomenon: if we do not have a “most appropriate” 
reference class ( in the sense of Theorem 5.6), then random worlds combines information 
from more specific classes as well as from more general classes. Hence, as we mentioned 
in the previous section, random worlds does not always validate inheritance reasoning: 
pure inheritance reasoning would always look to superclasses and ignore subclasses. 
We agree with Goodwin that this property of pure inheritance reasoning can lead to 
unintuitive conclusions, especially when we are dealing with quantitative information. 
‘s Strictly speaking, a direct application of Theorem 5.23 would require that KB,hirps contains 
-tIIMagpie(r)llx %i 0). But the maximum-entropy techniques of Section 6 can be used to show that 
this actually follows by default. Hence, by Proposition 5.2, we can consider this to be in KB,hi~ps. 
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The third and most important type of conflict is when we have incomparable reference 
classes. As we argued in Section 2.3, this case is likely to come up often in practice. 
While the complete characterization of the behavior of random worlds in such cases 
would appear to be complex, the following theorem illustrates what happens when the 
competing references classes are essentially disjoint. We capture “essentially disjoint” 
here by assuming that the overlap between these classes consists of precisely one 
member: the individual c addressed in our query. We can generalize the following 
theorem to the case where we simply assume that the overlap between competing 
reference classes 1+5 and @’ is small relative to the sizes of the two classes; that is, where 
II@(x) A V@‘(x) 1 V+(X) II,, M 0 and [1$(x) A $‘(x) 1 $‘(x)~~., z 0. For simplicity, we 
omit the details of this extension here. 
It turns out that, under this assumption, random worlds provides an independent 
derivation of a well-known technique for combining evidence: Dempster’s rule of com- 
bination [ 681. Dempster’s rule addresses the issue of combining independent pieces 
of evidence. Consider a query P(c) , and assume we have competing reference classes 
that are all appropriate for this query. In this case, the different pieces of evidence are 
the proportions of the property P in the different competing reference classes. More 
precisely, if &i(c) holds, we can view the fact that I/ P(x) ) #i(x) IIA M a; as giving 
evidence of weight cy; in favor of P(c). The fact that the intersection between the dif- 
ferent classes is “small” means that almost disjoint samples were used to compute these 
pieces of evidence; thus, it is perhaps reasonable to view them as being independent. 
Under this interpretation, Dempster’s rule tells us how to combine the different pieces 
of evidence to obtain an appropriate degree of belief in P(c). The function used in 
Dempster’s rule is 6 : [0, I]” + [ 0, 1 1, defined as follows: 
As the following theorem shows, this is also the answer obtained by random worlds. 
Since 6 is undefined if some LYE are equal to I while others are equal to 0, we assume 
that this is not the case in the theorem. 
Theorem 5.26. Let P be a unaty predicate, and consider a knowledge base KB of the 
following form: I9 
,,I !,I 
/j (l/P(X) I +il(X)llx ";%A$m))A A 3!X($i(X) A+,j(x))* 
;=I !,j=l,i#; 
where either ai < 1 for all i = 1,. , rn, or ai > 0 for all i = 1,. . , m. Then, if neither 
P nor c appear anywhere in the formulas fli (x) , then 
Pr,(P(c) (KB) =S(a~,...,a,~,). 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
I9 Here, Ll!x stands for “there exists a unique x such that .” 
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We illustrate this theorem on what is, perhaps, the most famous example of conflicting 
information-the Nixon Diamond [ 661. Suppose we are interested in assigning a degree 
of belief to the assertion “Nixon is a pacifist”. Assume that we know that Nixon is 
both a Quaker and a Republican, and we have statistical information for the proportion 
of pacifists within both classes. This is an example where we have two incomparable 
reference classes for the same query. More formally, assume that KBN~~,, is 
IIPacr$st(x) 1 Quaker(x) [IX ~1 cy A 
IIPuci@t(x) 1 Repubhzn(x) III 32 p A 
Quuker( Nixon) A Republicun( Nixon) A 
3!x (Quaker(x) A Republicun( x) ) , 
and that (D is Pucifst(Nixon). 2o The degree of belief Pr,(p I KBN~~,,) takes different 
values, depending on the values (Y and p for the two reference classes. If {cY,~} # 
(0, l}, then Pr,(q 1 KBN~**) always exists and its value is equal to olB+(l~~)C,_p). If, 
for example, /3 = 0.5, so that the information for Republicans is neutral, we get that 
Pr, (9 I KBN~~,,) = a: the data for Quakers is used to determine the degree of belief. 
If the evidence given by the two reference classes is conflicting-a > 0.5 > P-then 
Pr, (q ( KBN~“,,) E [a, /3] : some intermediate value is chosen. If, on the other hand, 
the two reference classes provide evidence in the same direction, then the degree of 
belief is greater than both (Y and /?. For example, if (Y = p = 0.8, then the degree 
of belief would be around 0.94. This has a reasonable explanation: if we have two 
independent bodies of evidence, both supporting q, when we combine them we should 
get even more support for (0. 
Now, assume that our information is not entirely quantitative. For example, we may 
know that “Quakers are typically pacifists”. In our framework, this corresponds to 
assigning LY = 1. If our information for Republicans is not a default, so that p > 0, 
then it follows from Theorem 5.26 that Pr,( cp I KBN~~,,) = 1. As expected, a default 
(i.e., an “extreme” value) dominates. But what happens in the case where we have 
conflicting defaults for the two reference classes. 7 It turns out that, in this case, the 
limiting probability does not exist. This is because the limit is nonrobust: its value 
depends on the way in which the tolerances 7’tend to 0. More precisely, if 71 < 72, so 
that the “almost all” in the statistical interpretation of the first conjunct is much closer 
to “all” than the “almost none” in the second conjunct is closer to “none”, then the 
limit is 1. We can view the magnitude of the tolerance as representing the strength of 
the default. Thus, in this case, the first conjunct represents a default with higher priority 
than the second conjunct. Symmetrically, if ri >> 72, then the limit is 0. On the other 
hand, if ri = 72, then the limit is l/2. 
The nonexistence of this limit is not simply a technical artifact of our approach. The 
fact that we obtain different limiting degrees of belief depending on how 7’ goes to 0 is 
closely related to the existence of multiple extensions in many other theories of default 
reasoning (for instance, in default logic [65] ). Both nonrobustness and the existence 
X’ As pointed out above, Theorem 5.26 can be generalized so that instead of asserting that Nixon is the only 
Quaker Republican, it is sufficient to assert that there are very few Quaker Republicans. 
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of more than one extension suggest a certain incompleteness of our knowledge. It is 
well known that, in the presence of conflicting defaults, we often need more information 
about the strength of the different defaults in order to resolve the conflict. Our approach 
has the advantage of pinpointing the type of information that would suffice to reach a 
decision. Note that our formalism does give us an explicit way to state in this example 
that the two extensions are equally likely, by asserting that the defaults that generate 
them have equal strength; namely, we can use ~1 to capture both default statements, 
rather than using pi and ~2. In this case, we get the answer I /2, as expected. However, 
it is not always appropriate to conclude that defaults have equal strength. It is not 
difficult to extend our language to allow the user to prioritize defaults, by defining the 
relative sizes of the components 7, of the tolerance vector. 
As we mentioned, Theorem 5.26 tells us only how to combine statistics from com- 
peting reference classes in the very special case where the intersection of the different 
reference classes is small. Shastri [ 71, pp. 331-332 ] describes a result in the same 
spirit, but for a different special case: he assumes that, in addition to the statistics for 
P within each reference class, the statistics for P in the general population are also 
known. Shastri’s result is based on maximum entropy. Maximum entropy is in fact a 
very general tool for computing degrees of belief, provided we restrict to knowledge 
bases that involve only unary predicates and are well behaved in a sense made precise 
in [ 281. (See the discussion in Section 6.) 
5.4. Independence 
As we have seen so far, random worlds captures many of the natural reasoning heuris- 
tics that have been proposed in the literature. Another heuristic is a default assumption 
that all properties are probabilistically independent unless we know otherwise. Random 
worlds captures this principle as well, in many cases, It is, in general, very hard to give 
simple syntactic tests for when a knowledge base forces two properties to be dependent. 
The following theorem concerns one very simple scenario where we can be sure that no 
relationship is forced. 
Consider two disjoint vocabularies @ and @‘, and two respective knowledge base and 
query pairs: KB, q E L( @), and KB’, 4p’ E C( @‘) . We can prove that 
Pr,(qA& KBAKB’) =Pr,(plKB) xP~,((D’(KB’). 
That is, if there is no connection between the symbols in the two vocabularies, the two 
queries will be independent: the probability of their conjunction is the product of their 
probabilities. We now prove a slightly more general case, where the two queries are 
both allowed to refer to some constant c. 
Theorem 5.27. Let @I and @2 be two subvocabularies of cf that are disjoint except 
for the constant c. Consider KB,, L,OI E L(@l ) and KBz, qp2 E L(&), Then 
Pr,(w A ‘~2 I KBI AK&) =Pr,(m I KBI) x Pr,(n I KB2). 
Proof. See the Appendix. 0 
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Although very simple, this theorem allows us to deal with such examples as the 
following: 
Example 5.28. Consider the knowledge base K&,,, and a knowledge base stating that 
40% of hospital patients are over 60 years old and that Eric is a patient. 
KB ,60 dLf ~)Over60( x) 1 Patient(x) III M5 0.4 A Putient(Eric) . 
Then 
Pr, ( Hep ( Eric) A Over60 ( Eric) 1 KBl,, A KB>60) 
= Pr,(Hep(Eric) I KBh,) x Pr,( Over60(Eric) I K&,jo) = 0.8 x 0.4 = 0.32. 
In the case of a unary vocabulary (i.e., one containing only unary predicates and 
constants), Theorem 5.27 can be proved using the connection between the random- 
worlds method and maximum entropy, which we discuss in Section 6. It is a well-known 
fact that using maximum entropy often leads to probabilistic independence. The result 
above proves that, with random worlds, this phenomenon appears in the nonunary case 
as well. 
We remark that the connection between maximum entropy and independence is some- 
times overstated. For example, neither maximum entropy nor random worlds lead to 
probabilistic independence in examples like the following: 
Example 5.29. Consider the knowledge base KB, describing a domain of animals: 
IIBlack(x) 1 Bird(x)II, ~1 0.2~ ((Bird(x)(l, ~2 0.1. 
It is perfectly consistent for Bird and Black to be probabilistically independent. If this 
were the case, we would expect the proportion of black animals to be the same as that 
of black birds. In this case, our degree of belief in BZack( Clyde), for some arbitrary 
animal Clyde, would also be 0.2. However, this is not the case. Since all the predicates 
here are unary we can use maximum-entropy techniques discussed in Section 6 to show 
that Pr, (Black( Clyde) I KB) = 0.47. That is, we are almost indifferent about Clyde 
being black, except for a slight bias due to the fact that he might be a bird and in that 
case is unlikely to be black. 
5.5. The lottery paradox and unique names 
In Section 3.5 we discussed the lottery paradox and the challenge it poses to theories 
of default reasoning. How does random worlds perform? 
To describe the original problem in our framework, let Ticket(x) hold if x purchased 
a lottery ticket. Consider the knowledge base consisting of 
KB = 3!x Winner(x) A Vx (Winner(x) + Ticket(x) ) . 
That is, there is a unique winner, and in order to win one must purchase a lottery 
ticket. If we also know the size of the lottery, say N, we can add to our knowledge 
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base the assertion EINx Ticket(x) stating that there are precisely N ticket holders. (This 
assertion can easily be expressed in first-order logic using equality.) We also assume 
for simplicity that each individual buys at most one lottery ticket. Then our degree of 
belief that the individual denoted by a particular constant c wins the lottery is 
Pr, ( Winner(c) ( KB A ?X Ticket(x) A Ticket(c) ) = $. 
Our degree of belief that .so/~eorlr wins will obviously be I. We would argue that these 
are reasonable answers. It is true that we do not get the default conclusion that c does 
not win (i.e., degree of belief 0). But since our probabilistic framework can and does 
express the conclusion that c is very unlikely to win, this is not a serious problem 
(unlike in systems which either reach a default conclusion or not, with no possibilities 
in between). 
If we do not know the exact number of ticket holders, but have only the qualitative 
information that this number is “large”, then our degree of belief that c wins the lottery is 
simply Pr, ( Winner(c) 1 KB A Ticket(c) ) = 0, although, as before, Pr, (3x Winner(x) 1 
KB) = 1. In this case we do conclude by default that any particular individual will not 
win, although we still have degree of belief 1 that someone does win. This shows that 
the tension Lifschitz sees between concluding a fact for any particular individual and 
yet not concluding the universal does in fact have a solution in a probabilistic setting 
such as ours. 
Finally, we consider where random worlds fils into Poole’s analysis of the lottery para- 
dox. Recall, his argument concentrated on examples in which a class (such as Bird(x) ) 
is known to be equal to the union of a number of subclasses (Penguin(x), Errzu( x) , . . ), 
each of which is exceptional in at least one respect. However, using our statistical in- 
terpretation of defaults, “exceptional” implies “makes up a negligible fraction of the 
population”. So under our interpretation, Poole’s example is inconsistent: we cannot 
partition the set of birds into a finite number of subclasses, each of which makes up a 
negligible fraction of the whole set. We view the inconsistency in this case as a feature: 
it alerts the user that this collection of defaults cannot all be true of the world (given 
our interpretation of defaults), just as would the inconsistency of the default “Birds 
typically fly” with “Birds typically do not fly” or “No bird flies”. 
Our treatment of Poole’s example clearly depends on our interpretation of defaults. For 
instance, we could interpret the default “Birds typically fly” as l/Fly(x) / Bird(x) IIx k a 
for some appropriately chosen cy which is less than 1. In this case, “exceptional” sub- 
classes (such as penguins which are nonflying birds) can include a nonvanishing fraction 
of the domain. While allowing an interpretation of default not based on “almost all” 
does make Poole’s KB consistent, it entails giving up many of the attractive properties of 
the = 1 representation (such as having default conclusions assigned a degree of belief 
1, and the properties summarized in Theorem 5.3). An alternative solution would be to 
use the approach presented in [ 381. Roughly speaking, this approach interprets “almost 
all” as “arbitrarily close to I” whenever such an interpretation is consistent (and thus 
allows us to get the benefits associated with this interpretation). If this interpretation 
is inconsistent, it takes “almost all” to mean “within T of I”, for 7 large enough to 
maintain consistency. 
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We conclude this section by remarking on another property of the random-worlds 
method. Applications of default reasoning are often simplified by using the unique 
names assumption, which says that any two constants should (but perhaps only by 
default) denote different objects. In random worlds, there is a strong automatic bias 
towards unique names. If cl and c:! are not mentioned anywhere in KB, then Pr,(ct = 
c2 1 KB) = 0 (see [ 28, Lemma D.1 ] for a formal proof of this fact). Of course, when 
we know something about ct and c2 it is possible to find examples for which this result 
fails; for instance Pr,(ct = c2 1 (cl = ~3.) V (c:! = cg) V (cl = cg)) = l/3. It is hard to 
give a general theorem saying precisely when the bias towards unique names overrides 
other considerations. However, we note that both of the “benchmark” examples that 
Lifschitz has given concerning unique names [48] are correctly handled by random 
worlds. For instance, Lifschitz’s problem Cl is: 
( 1) Different names normally denote different people. 
(2) The names “Ray” and “Reiter” denote the same person. 
(3) The names “Drew” and “McDermott” denote the same person. 
The desired conclusion here is: 
a The names “Ray” and “Drew” denote different people. 
Random worlds gives us this conclusion. That is, 
Pr, (Ray # Drew ( Ray = Reiter A Drew = McDermott) = 1. 
Furthermore, we do not have to explicitly state a unique names default. 
6. Random worlds and maximum entropy 
The principle of maximum entropy is a well-known idea, useful for certain types 
of probabilistic reasoning. Briefly, the entropy of a probability distribution p over a 
finite space 0 is defined as H(p) = - CUE0 p (CO) ln(k(o)). It has been argued [70] 
that the entropy measures the amount of “information” in a probability distribution, in 
the sense of information theory; note that the uniform distribution has the maximum 
possible entropy. The principle of maximum entropy [ 341 addresses situations in which 
we have some constraints on a probability distribution, which may have many solutions, 
but where we must decide on one particular consistent distribution. The principle asserts 
that among those distributions satisfying the constraints, the one that should be adopted 
is the (hopefully unique) distribution having maximum entropy, because it incorporates 
the least additional information beyond the constraints themselves. 
No explicit use of maximum entropy is made by random worlds.21 Indeed, although 
they are both tools for reasoning about probabilities, the classes of problems considered 
by the two methods are seemingly disjoint. Nevertheless, it turns out that there is a 
surprising and very close connection between the random-worlds approach and maximum 
entropy provided that the language consists only of unary predicates and constants. In 
21 In fact, the postulate of uniform probability over worlds (i.e., indifference) can be seen as a degenerate 
application of maximum entropy. However, in the context of this paper, this is rather uninteresting and is 
unrelated to the connection we discuss in the rest of this section. 
this section we briefly describe this connection. This result is of considerable interest 
simply because it hints at effective computational techniques for random worlds in 
the unary case. However, as we discuss below, the connection to random worlds is 
interesting for other reasons as well. For instance, we use the connection to show 
that the maximum-entropy approach to default reasoning, considered in [23], can be 
embedded in our framework. 
To understand the connection to maximum entropy, suppose the language consists of 
the unary predicate symbols PI . . , Pk together with some constant symbols. (Thus, we 
do not allow either function symbols or higher arity predicates.) We can consider the 
2” CUO~ZS that can be formed from these predicate symbols, namely, the formulas of the 
form Q) A. A Qk, where each Q; is either P, or IPi. Then the knowledge base KB can 
be viewed as simply placing constraints on the proportion of domain elements satisfying 
each atom. For example, the formula l/P) (x) / P?(x) IIx = l/2 says that the proportion 
of the domain satisfying some atom containing PI as a conjunct is twice the proportion 
satisfying atoms containing both PI and Pz as conjuncts. For unary languages (only) 
it can be shown that every formula can he rewritten in a canonical form from which 
constraints on the possible proportions of atoms can be simply derived. Details of this 
and all other specific results can be found in [ 281, although the general phenomenon 
we are about to discuss is addressed in many places, such as [ 57,7 I ] and in statistical 
physics (e.g.. [ 441 ). 
The set of constraints generated by KB defines a subset of [O, I]“, which we call 
S(KB). That is. each vector in S(KB). say I?’ = (p). . ,pz~), is a solution of the 
constraints defined by KB (where /jr is the proportion of atom i). For example, suppose 
our language contains only the two predicate symbols {PI, Pl}, so that there are four 
atoms 
A, = P, A P2. A2 = P, i: -P2. A3 = -P, A Pz. A4 = TP, A -7P> 
Let KB = YxP,(x) A //PI(X) /\Pz)~(.Y);~~ :>I 0.3. The first conjunct of KB clearly 
constrains both ye and p4 (the proportion of domain elements satisfying atoms A3 and 
A4) to be 0. The second conjunct forces p) to he (approximately) at most l/3. Thus, 
S(KB) = {(p,,. .,p4) t IO. I I’: PI s 0.3.p~ =/A$ =o,p, +p2 = I}. 
The connection between maximum entropy and the random-worlds method is based 
on the following observations. With every world W. we can associate the vector ir”. 
where p,‘” is IIAi(x)jj, in W. Each vector d can be viewed as a probability distribution 
over the space of atoms A 1. . ADA ; WC can therefore associate an entropy with each 
such vector. We define the errtr’ol>y of W to be the entropy of p”. Now, consider some 
point p’ E S( KB). What is the number of worlds W E WN such that p”” = I?? Clearly, 
for those I?’ where some p, is not an integer multiple of l/N, the answer is 0. However, 
for those p’ which are “possible”. this number grows asymptotically as eNH(ii?. Hence, 
there are vastly more worlds W for which /7”” IS “near” the maximum-entropy point of 
S(KB) than there are worlds elsewhere. This allows us to prove the following result: if, 
for all sufficiently small 7’, a formula 0 is true in all worlds around the maximum-entropy 
point(s) of S(KB), then Pr, (0 ! KB) = I. 
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In the above example, the maximum-entropy point in S(KB) is p” = (0.3,0.7,0,0). 
Our knowledge base only tells us that the size of atom A1 is (approximately) less 
than or equal to l/3. But now, consider some small fixed E and the formula 0[ E] = 
II&(x)\\, E [0.3 - ~,0.3 + E]. Since this formula certainly holds at all worlds W 
where p” is sufficiently close to p”, we conclude that Pr, (01 E] ) KB) = 1. This 
allows us to use Proposition 5.2 to conclude that, for any formula 40, Pr,( cp 1 KB) = 
Pr, (4p 1 KB A 0 [E] ) . In particular, this holds for 4p = P2( c) . But now, we can use 
direct inference to conclude that Pr, (P?(c) 1 KE) E [0.3 - E, 0.3 +E] . Since this holds 
for all sufficiently small E, we conclude that Pr,( P2( c) j KB) = 0.3, as desired. In 
[28] we formalize this argument and generalize it to more complex examples. These 
techniques allow us to use a maximum-entropy computation as a basis for computing 
degrees of belief. The resulting procedure applies to many cases not covered by our 
results in Section 5. Furthermore, since we can take advantage of existing algorithms 
for computing maximum entropy (see [ 221 and the references therein), we obtain a 
technique of potential practical significance. 
The connection to maximum entropy is important for many reasons, aside from its 
computational implications. Maximum entropy has been a popular technique for proba- 
bilistic reasoning in AI and elsewhere. Two highly relevant works are the application to 
inheritance hierarchies by Shastri [ 711 and to default reasoning by Goldszmidt, Morris, 
and Pearl [23]. It is desirable that such a popular technique be well understood and 
motivated, rather than be seen as an ad hoc heuristic. Random worlds, resting on the ba- 
sic principle of indifference, provides motivation which some may find more convincing 
than the usual information-theoretic justifications. 
Not only does the random-worlds method provide motivation for maximum entropy, it 
can be viewed as a generalization of it. As discussed above, there is a strong connection 
between the random-worlds approach and maximum entropy in the unary case (see also 
[28]). In fact, restricted versions of some of our results from Section 5 can be proved 
using maximum entropy (see [ 7 1 ] ) . But our combinatorial proof techniques are more 
general (and, in fact, simpler) than the ones based directly on entropy. The limitations 
of maximum entropy are perhaps inescapable, because (as we discuss in detail in [ 281) 
it is reasonable to conjecture that maximum entropy is inherently inapplicable once we 
move beyond unary predicates. 
Finally, our results connecting random worlds to maximum entropy can also be put to 
use to help clarify the connection between random worlds and previous approaches to 
applying probabilistic semantics to default reasoning. The mainstay of most of this pre- 
vious work has been the formalism of c-semantics [ 201. We briefly review E-semantics 
here. 
Consider a language consisting of propositional formulas (over some finite set of 
propositional variables PI,. . , Pk) and default rules of the form B -+ C (read “B’s 
are typically C’s”), where B and C are propositional formulas. Let 0 be the set of 2k 
propositional worlds, corresponding to the possible truth assignments to the variables. 
Given a probability distribution p on R, we define p(B) to be the probability of the set 
of worlds where B is true. We say that a distribution f..~ c-satisjes a default rule B --* C 
ifp(C)B)>l-E. 
A parameterized probability distribution (PPD) is a collection {,u~}~,o f probability 
distributions over 0. parameterized by E. A PPD {,LL~)~,o e-satisfies a set R of default 
rules if for every E, ,uu, e-satisfies every rule r E R. A set R of default rules c-entails 
B - C if for every PPD that E-satisfies R. limc,~ ,uu,(C 1 B) = I. 
As shown in [ 201, e-entailment possesses a number of reasonable properties typically 
associated with default reasoning, including a preference for more specific information. 
However, e-entailment is very weak. In particular, as shown by Adams [ I 1, the conse- 
quence relation defined by e-entailment satisfies only the five basic properties of default 
inference given in Section 3.2. Hence. among other limitations, it has no ability to ignore 
irrelevant information, so it cannot perform any inheritance reasoning. 
In order to obtain additional desirable properties, it is necessary to restrict the class 
of admissible PPD’s. Goldszmidt, Morris, and Pearl [ 231 focus attention on a single 
PPD: the maxinzum-entropy PfD {,u~,~}~,~~ (see [ 231 for precise definitions and tech- 
nical details). A rule B + C is defined to be an ME-plausible consequeme of R if 
lim,,o ~z,~( C j B) = 1. The notion of ME-plausible consequence is analyzed in detail 
in [23], where it is shown to inherit all the nice properties of c-entailment while hav- 
ing some ability to ignoring irrelevant information. Equally importantly, algorithms are 
provided for computing the ME-plausible consequences of a set of rules in certain cases 
(see also [24] ). 
Our results relating random worlds to maximum entropy can be used to show that 
the approach of [23] can be embedded in our framework in a straightforward manner. 
We simply convert all default rules r of the form B -+ C into formulas of the form 
@. =def l/$k(x) 1 h(X)//., =I 1, where @B is the formula obtained by replacing each 
occurrence of the propositional variable p, in B with P,(X). Note that the formulas that 
arise under this conversion all use the same approximate equality relation XI, since the 
approach of [23] uses the same E for all default rules. Note also that propositional 
variables become unary predicates. Hence, default rules become statistical assertions 
about classes of individuals. Under this translation, we obtain the following theorem 
(which is proved, and discussed in more detail, in I28 J ). 
Theorem 6.1. Let c be u comtant synbol. U.&g the tramlation described above, for 
any .set ‘R of defeasible rules, B 4 C is an ME-plausible consequence qf R iff 
Pr, f/+(c) / /j 
rER 
Hence, all the computational techniques and results described in [23] carry over to this 
special case of our approach. Furthermore. unary versions of all of our theorems carry 
over to the ME-plausible consequence relation. Examples demonstrating inheritance were 
given in [ 23 1, but we can now use Theorem 5.16 to provide a formal characterization of 
some of the inheritance properties of this consequence relation. It should also be noted 
that our translation converts the default rules into statistical assertions about classes 
of individuals and it converts the context, i.e.. B, into information about a particular 
individual (whose name we have arbitrarily chosen to be c). This is in keeping with the 
intuitive interpretations of rules and context used by propositional default systems (see 
Section 3.4). 
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We stress that the assumption that we use the same approximate equality relation is 
crucial in Theorem 6.1. Geffner [ 211 gives an example of an anomalous conclusion 
obtained in the system of [23]. Suppose the rule set ‘R consists of the two rules 
P A S -+ Q and R + -Q. In this case, the rule P A S A R -+ Q is not an ME-plausible 
consequence of R. This seems reasonable, as we have evidence for Q (P A S) and 
against Q (R), and neither piece of evidence is more specific than the other. However, 
if we add the new rule P -+ -Q to R, then P A S A R -+ Q does become an ME- 
plausible consequence of R. This behavior seems counterintuitive, and is a consequence 
of [231’s use of the same E for all of the rules. Intuitively, what is occurring here is 
that prior to the addition of the rule P -+ -Q, the sets P(x) A S(x) and R(x) were of 
comparable size. The new rule forces P(x) A S(x) to be an e-small subset of P(x) , 
since almost all P’s are -Q’s, whereas almost all P A S’s are Q’s. The size of the set 
R(x), on the other hand, is unaffected. Hence, the default for the e-smaller class P A S 
now takes precedence over the class R. Once we allow a family of approximate equality 
connectives, each one corresponding to a different E, we are no longer forced to derive 
this conclusion. An appropriate choice of ri can make the default I] 7Q< x) ( R(x) IJx Mi 1 
so strong that the number of Q’s in the set R(x), and hence the number of Q’s in the 
subsetP(x)AS(x)AR(x),ismuchsma11erthanthesizeofthesetP(x)AS(x)AR(x). 
In this case, the rule R -+ -Q takes precedence over the rule P A S -+ Q. With no 
specific information about the relative strengths of the defaults we get nonrobustness, as 
in the Nixon Diamond. That is, we draw no conclusions about P A S A R -+ Q. 
7. Problems 
The principle of indifference and maximum entropy have both been subject to crit- 
icism. Any such criticism is, at least potentially, relevant to random worlds. Hence, it 
is important that we examine the difficulties that people have found. In this section, 
we consider problems relating to causal reasoning, language dependence, acceptance, 
learning and computation. 
7.1. Causal and temporal information 
The random-worlds method can use knowledge bases which include statistical, first- 
order, and default information. When is this language sufficient? We suspect that it 
is, in fact, adequate for most traditional knowledge representation tasks. Nevertheless, 
the question of adequacy can be subtle. This is certainly the case for the important 
domain of reasoning about actions, using causal and temporal information. In principle, 
there would seem to be no difficulty choosing a suitable first-order vocabulary that 
includes the ability to talk about time explicitly. In the semantics appropriate to many 
such languages, a world might model an entire temporal sequence of events. However, 
finding a representation with sufficient expressivity is only part of the problem: we need 
to know whether the degrees of belief we derive will correctly reflect our intuitions 
about causal reasoning. It turns out that random worlds gives unintuitive results when 
used with the most straightforward representations of temporal knowledge. 
126 IT L(trcr~lrus r/ trl. /AI-trficxtl I~rltrllipwc~r 87 (19%) 75-143 
This observation is not really a new one. As we have observed, the random-worlds 
method is closely related to maximum entropy (in the context of a unary knowledge 
base). One significant criticism of maximum-entropy techniques has been that they seem 
to have difficulty dealing with causal information [ 33,581. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the random-worlds method also gives peculiar answers if we represent causal and 
temporal information naively. On the other hand, Hunter [ 33 ] has shown that maximum- 
entropy methods can deal with causal information, provided it is represented appropri- 
ately. We have recently shown that by using an appropriate representation (related to 
Hunter’s, but nevertheless distinct). the random-worlds method can also deal well with 
causal information 161. Indeed, our representation allows us to (a) deal with predic- 
tion and explanation problems, (b) represent causal information of the type implicit in 
Baycsian causal networks [ 58 1. and Cc) provide a clean and concise solution to the 
frame problem in the situation calculus 154 1. In particular, our proposal deals well with 
some of‘ the standard problems in the area. such as the Yale Shooting Problem (321. 
The details of the proposal are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the fact we 
want to emphasize here is that there may bc more than one reasonable way to represent 
our knowledge of a given domain. When one formulation does not work as we expect, 
we can look for other ways of representing the problem. It will often turn out that the 
new representation captures some subtle aspects of the domain, that were ignored by the 
naive representation. (We believe that this is the case with our alternative formulation 
of reasoning about actions.) WC return to this issue a number of times below. 
As WC saw above. random worlds suftbrs Irom ;I problem ot‘ representation dcpen- 
dence: causal information is treated correctly only if it is represented appropriately. This 
shows that choosing the “right” representation of our knowledge is important in the 
context of the random-worlds approach. 
In some ways. this representation dependence is a serious problem because, in practice, 
how can we know whether WC have chosen a good representation or not? Before 
addressing this. WC note that the situation with random worlds is actually not as bad as it 
might be. As WC pointed out in Section 5. I. the random-worlds approach is not sensitive 
to merely syntactic changes in the knowledge hasc: logically equivalent knowledge bases 
always result in the same degrees of belief. So if a changed representation gives different 
answers, it can only be because WC have changed the semantics: we might be using 
a different ontology. or the new representation might model the world with a different 
level of detail and accuracy. The representation dependence exhibited by random worlds 
concerns more than mere syntax. This gives us some hope that the phenomenon can be 
understood and, at least in some cases, be seen to be entirely appropriate. 
Unfortunately, it does seem as if random worlds really is too sensitive; minor and 
seemingly irrelevant changes can affect things. Perhaps the most disturbing examples 
concern lnnguagr dependence, or sensitivity to definitional changes. For instance, sup- 
pose the only predicate in our language is Mite and we take KB to be true. Then 
Pr,, ( White(c) / KB) = I /2. On the other hand, if we refine 7 White by adding Red and 
Blw to our language and having KB’ assert that -1White is their disjoint union, then 
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Pr,( White( c) 1 KB’) = l/3. The fact that simply expanding the language and giving a 
definition of an old notion ( TWhite) in terms of the new notions (Red and Blue) can 
affect the degree of belief seems to be a serious problem. There are several approaches 
to dealing with this issue. 
One approach to dealing with representation independence is to search for a method 
of computing degrees of belief that does not suffer from it. To do this, it is important to 
have a formal definition of representation independence. Once we have such a definition, 
we can investigate whether there are nontrivial approaches to generating degrees of belief 
that are representation independent. For example, one might think that the problem lies 
with our use of point-valued degrees of belief. After all, it is fairly obvious that (under 
a few very weak assumptions) any approach that gives point-valued degrees of belief 
that act like probabilities cannot be representation independent. In fact, there has been 
considerable debate about the “excess precision” forced by point-valued probabilities. 
Perhaps if we generalize our concept of “degree of belief”, say to intervals rather than 
point values in [ 0, 11, we can address these concerns, as well as avoid the problem of 
representation dependence. Unfortunately, while interval-valued degrees of belief might 
well be representation independent in many more circumstances than random worlds, 
they do not solve the problem. Halpern and Koller, in [ 311, provide a definition of 
representation independence in the context of probabilistic reasoning, and show that 
essentially any interesting nondeductive inference procedure cannot be representation 
independent in their sense. 
Another response is to accept this, but to declare that representation dependence is 
justified, i.e., that the choice of an appropriate vocabulary is indeed a significant one, 
which does encode some of the information at our disposal. In our example above, we 
can view the choice of vocabulary as reflecting the bias of the reasoner with respect 
to the partition of the world into colors. Researchers in machine learning and the 
philosophy of induction have long realized that bias is an inevitable component of 
effective inductive reasoning. So we should not be completely surprised if it turns out 
that the related problem of finding degrees of belief should also depend on the bias. 
Of course, if this is the case we would hope to have a good intuitive understanding of 
how the degrees of belief depend on the bias. In particular, we would like to give the 
knowledge base designer some guidelines to selecting the “appropriate” representation. 
This is an important and seemingly difficult problem in the context of random worlds. 
A third response to the problem is to prove representation independence with respect 
to a large class of queries (see also [ 3 1 ] ) . To understand this approach, consider another 
example. Suppose that we know that only about half of birds can fly, Tweety is a bird, 
and Opus is some other individual (who may or may not be a bird). One obvious way 
to represent this information is to have a language with predicates Bird and Fly, and 
take the KB to consist of the statements jlFly(x) ) Bird(x) Jlx x 0.5 and Bird(Tweety). 
It is easy to see that Pr, (Fly( Tweety) ( KB) = 0.5 and Pr,(Bird( Opus) ( KB) = 0.5. 
But suppose that we had chosen to use a different language, one that uses the basic 
predicates Bird and FlyingBird. We would then take KB’ to consist of the statements 
1) FlyingBird( x) 1 Bird(x) JIx x 0.5, Bird( Tweety), and Vlx( FlyingBird( x) + Bird(x) ) 
We now get Pr,( FlyingBird( Tweezy) ] KB’) = 0.5 and Pr,( Bird( Opus) 1 KB’) = 2/3. 
Note that our degree of belief that Tweety Aies is 0.5 in both cases. In fact, one can 
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give an argument that this conclusion is robust against many “reasonable” representation 
changes. On the other hand, our degree of belief that Opus is a bird differs in the 
two representations. Arguably, the fact that our degree of belief that Opus is a bird is 
language dependent is a direct reflection of the fact that our knowledge base does not 
contain sufficient information to assign it a single “justified” value. This suggests that 
it would be useful to characterize those queries that are language independent, while 
recognizing that not all queries will be. 
7.3. Acceptance and learning 
The most fundamental assumption in this paper is that we are given a knowledge 
base KB and wish to calculate degrees of belief relative this knowledge. We have 
not considered how one comes to know KB in the first place. That is, when do we 
accept information as knowledge‘? We do not have a good answer to this question. 
This is unfortunate, since it seems plausible that the processes of gaining knowledge 
and computing degrees of belief should be interrelated. In particular, Kyburg [43] has 
argued that perhaps we might accept assertions that are believed sufficiently strongly. 
For example, suppose we observe a block b that appears to be white. It could be that 
we are is not entirely sure that the block is indeed white; it might be some other light 
color. Nevertheless, if our confidence in White(b) exceeds some threshold, we might 
accept it (and so include it in KB). 
The problem of acceptance in such examples, concerned with what we learn directly 
from the senses, is well known in philosophy [ 351. But the problem of acceptance we 
face is even more difficult than usual, because of our statistical language. Under what 
circumstances is a statement such as lJFl~(n-) j Bird(x) /lx M 0.9 accepted as knowledge? 
Although we regard this as an objective statement about the world, it is unrealistic to 
suppose that anyone could examine all the birds in the world and count how many 
of them fly. In practice, it seems that this statistical statement would appear in KB if 
someone inspects a (presumably large) sample of birds and about 90% of the birds in 
this sample fly. Then a leap is made: the sample is assumed to be typical, and we then 
conclude that 90% of all birds fly. This would be in the spirit of Kyburg’s suggestion so 
long as we believe that, with high confidence, the full population has statistics similar 
to those of the sample. 
Unfortunately, the random-worlds method by itself does not support this leap, at least 
not if we represent the sampling in the most obvious way. That is, suppose we represent 
our sample using a predicate S. We could then represent the fact that 90% of a sample 
of birds fly as [[Fly(x) 1 Bird(x) A S(x)jj, M 0.9. If the KB consists of this fact and 
Bird( Tweety), we might hope that Prco(Fly(Tweety) ) KB) = 0.9, but it is not. In fact, 
random worlds treats the birds in S and those outside S as two unrelated populations; it 
maintains the default degree of belief ( l/2) that a bird not in S will fy. 22 Intuitively, 
random worlds is not treating S as a random sample. 
22 A related observation, that random worlds cannot do learning (although in a somewhat different sense), was 
made by Carnap [ 121, who apparently lost his enthusiasm for (his version of) random worlds for precisely 
this reason. 
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Of course, the failure of the obvious approach does not imply that random worlds is 
incapable of learning statistics. As was the case for causal reasoning, the solution may 
be to find an appropriate representation. Perhaps we need a representation reflecting the 
fact that different individuals do not acquire their properties completely independently 
of each other. If we see that an animal is tall, it may tell us something about its genetic 
structure and so, by this mechanism, hint at properties of other animals. But clearly this 
issue is subtle. If we see a giraffe, this tells us much less about the height of animals 
in general than it does about other giraffes, and a good representation should reflect 
this. 
While we still hope to find ways of doing sampling within random worlds, we can 
also look for other ways of coping with the problem of learning. One idea is to add 
statements about degrees of belief to the knowledge base. Thus, if 20% of animals in a 
sample are tall, and we believe that it is appropriate to learn this statistic, then we might 
add a statement such as Pr( J]Tall(x) 1 Animal(x) /IX ~1 0.2) 2 0.9 to the KB. Although 
this does not “automate” the sampling procedure, it allows us to use our belief that 
a sample is likely to be representative, without committing absolutely to this fact. In 
particular, this representation allows further evidence to convince the agent that a sample 
is, in fact, biased. Adding degrees of belief would also let us deal with the problem of 
acceptance, mentioned at the beginning of this subsection. If we believe that block b is 
white, but are not certain, we could write Pr( White( b)) 2 0.9. We then do not have to 
fix an arbitrary threshold for acceptance. 
Adding degree of belief statements to a knowledge base is a nontrivial step. Up 
to now, all the assertions we allowed in a knowledge base were either true or false 
in a given world. This is not the case for a degree of belief statement. Indeed, our 
semantics for degrees of belief involve looking at sets of possible worlds. Thus, in order 
to handle such a statement appropriately, we would need to ensure that our probability 
distribution over the possible worlds satisfies the associated constraint. A number of 
different approaches to doing this are discussed in [7], and shown to be essentially 
equivalent. 
Yet another approach for dealing with the learning problem is to use a variant of 
random worlds presented in [4] called the random-propensities approach. Random 
worlds has a strong bias towards believing that exactly half the domain has any given 
property, and this is not always reasonable. Why should it be more likely that half of 
all birds fly than that a third of them do? Roughly speaking, the random-propensities 
approach postulates the existence of a parameter denoting the “propensity” of a bird 
to fly. Initially, all propensities are equally likely. Observing a flying bird gives us 
information about the propensity of birds to fly, and hence about the flying ability of 
other birds. As shown in [4], the random-propensities method does, indeed, learn from 
samples. We can also show [ 37 ] that the random-propensities approach has many of the 
same attractive properties that we have shown for random worlds, in particular direct 
inference, specificity, and irrelevance. Unfortunately, random propensities has its own 
problems. In particular, it learns “too often”, i.e., even from arbitrary subsets that are not 
representative samples. Given the assertion “All giraffes are tall”, random propensities 
would conclude that almost everything is tall. Addressing this problem appropriately is 
an important issue that deserves further investigation. 
Our goal in this research has been to understand some of the fundamental issues 
involved in first-order probabilistic and default reasoning. Until such issues are under- 
stood, it is perhaps reasonable to ignore or downplay concerns about computation. If 
an ideal normative theory turns out to be impractical for computational reasons, we can 
still use it as guidance in a starch for approximations and heuristics. 
As WC show in [27]. computing degrees of belief according to random worlds is, 
indeed. intractable in general. This is not surprising: our language extends lirst-order 
logic. for which validity is undecidable.” Although unfortunate, we do not view this 
as an insurmountable problem. Note that, in spite of its undecidability, first-order logic 
is nevertheless vicwcd as a powerful and useful tool. We believe that the situation with 
random worlds is analogous. Random worlds is not just a computational tool; it is 
inherently interesting because of what it can tell us about probabilistic reasoning. 
But even in terms of computation. the situation with random worlds is not as bleak as 
it might seem. We have presented one class of much more tractable knowledge bases: 
those using only unary predicates and constants. We showed in [28] and in Section 6 
that. in this case, we can often use maximum entropy as a computational tool in deriving 
degrees of belief. While computing maximum entropy is also hard in general, there are 
heuristic techniques that work efticiently in practical cases. As we have already claimed, 
this class of problems is an important one. In general, many properties of interest can 
be expressed using unary predicates, since they express properties of individuals. Fat 
example, in physics applications we are interested in such predicates as quantum state 
(set [ Ifi]). Similarly, AI applications and expert systems typically use only unary 
predicates [ 131 such as symptoms and diseases. In fact, a good case can be made 
that statisticians tend to reformulate all problems in terms of unary predicates, since an 
event in a sample space can be identified with a unary predicate 1691. Indeed, most 
cases where statistics are used, we have a basic unit in mind (an individual, a family, a 
household, etc.). and the properties (predicates 1 we consider are typically relative to a 
single unit (i.e., unary predicates). Thus, results concerning computing degrees of belief 
for unary knowledge bases are quite significant in practice. 
Even for nonunary knowledge bases, there is hope. The intractability proofs given in 
[ 27) use knowledge bases that l’orcc the possible worlds to mimic a Turing machine 
computation. Typical knowledge bases do not usually encode Turing machines! There 
may therefore be many cases in which computation is practical. In particular, specific 
domains typically impose additional structure, which may simplify computation. This 
seems quite possibly to be the case. in particular, in certain problems that involve 
reasoning about action. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, WC (XXII compute degrees of belief in many interesting 
cases. In particular, we have presented a number of theorems that tell us what the degrees 
of belief are for certain important classes of knowledge bases and queries. Most of these 
theorems hold for our language in its full generality, including nonunary predicates. 
” Although. in fact. finding degrees of belief wing random worlds is even IPZOW intractable than the problem 
of deciding validity in first-order logic 
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We believe that many more such results could be found. Particularly interesting would 
be more “irrelevance” results that tell us when large parts of the knowledge base can 
be ignored. Such results could then be used to reduce apparently complex problems to 
simpler forms, to which other techniques apply. We have already seen in some of the 
examples that combining different results can often let us compute degrees of belief in 
cases where no single result suffices. 
Nevertheless, there are many natural knowledge bases that fail to meet the syntactic re- 
strictions required by the theorems we have provided. In particular, the default-reasoning 
literature includes many quite complicated examples, and we have often found that we 
cannot understand random worlds’ behavior on these without some (often nontrivial) 
special-purpose arguments. (Interestingly, it seems to us that the complexity of the 
required arguments is correlated with how controversial the example is!) 
Of course, these difficulties suggest a research strategy: that of characterizing the 
behavior of the random-worlds method on ever larger classes of examples. We close 
by hinting at one of the interesting technical challenges that confronts such a research 
agenda. It turns out (perhaps not that surprisingly) that a major obstacle is simply 
the richness of our language. Consider Theorem 5.16. Recall that we had to impose 
rather severe syntactic restrictions, whose purpose was to ensure that we could identify 
all the subformulas relevant to a property p(x). The conditions were made so strong 
because in general it is easy, in a language with as much expressive power as ours, to 
construct examples in which one part of the knowledge base places nontrivial logical 
or probabilistic constraints on a superficially (i.e., syntactically) unrelated concept. We 
certainly believe that random worlds can do inheritance and irrelevance reasoning in a 
much more comprehensive fashion than suggested by this particular result. But it appears 
to be hard to state clean, checkable, conditions in a way that does not admit contrived 
counterexamples. Some progress in this regard is made in [ 371, where additional tools 
are provided for testing whether formulas can be treated as being irrelevant. In fact, 
the results of [37] can be viewed as steps towards characterizing the properties of a 
prior distribution that lead to results such as Theorems 5.6 and 5.16, and show that 
such results apply to priors other than the uniform prior used in the random-worlds 
method. 
8. Summary 
The random-worlds approach for probabilistic reasoning is derived from two very 
intuitive ideas: possible worlds and the principle of indifference. In spite of its simple 
semantics, it has many attractive features: 
l It can deal with very rich knowledge bases that involve quantitative information in 
the form of statistics, qualitative information in the form of defaults, and first-order 
information. The language is sufficiently powerful for even fairly esoteric demands 
such as the representation of nested defaults. 
l It uses a simple and well-motivated statistical interpretation for defaults. The cor- 
responding semantics allow us to examine the reasonableness of a default with 
respect to our entire knowledge base, including other default rules. 
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l It validates many desirable properties, like a preference for more specific informa- 
tion, the ability to ignore irrelevant information, a default assumption of unique 
names, the ability to combine different pieces of evidence, and more. Most impor- 
tantly, these properties arise naturally from the very simple semantics of random 
worlds. In particular, ad hoc assumptions. designed to realize these properties, play 
no part in the definition of the method. 
l It avoids many of the problems that have plagued systems of reference-class rea- 
soning (such as the disjunctive reference-class problem) and many of the problems 
that have plagued systems of nonmonotonic reasoning (such as exceptional sub- 
class inheritance and the lottery paradox). Many systems have been forced to work 
hard to avoid problems which. in fact. never even arise for random worlds, 
l The random-worlds approach subsumes several important reasoning systems, and 
generalizes them to the case of first-order logic. In particular, it encompasses deduc- 
tive reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, certain theories of nonmonotonic inference, 
the principle of maximum entropy, some rules of evidence combination, and more. 
But it is far more powerful than any of these individual systems. 
As we saw in Section 7, there are certainly some problems with the random-worlds 
method. We believe that these problems are far from insuperable. But, even conceding 
these problems for the moment, the substantial success of random worlds supports a few 
general conclusions. 
One conclusion concerns the role of statistics and degrees of belief. The difference be- 
tween these, and the problem of relating the two, is at the heart of our work. People have 
long realized that degrees of belief provide a powerful model for understanding rational 
behavior (for instance, through decision theory). The random-worlds approach shows 
that it is possible to assign degrees of belief, using a principled technique, in almost 
any circumstance. The ideal situation. in which we have complete statistical knowledge 
concerning a domain, is, of course, dealt with appropriately by random worlds, But more 
realistically, even partial statistical information (which need not be precise) can still be 
utilized by random worlds to give useful answers, Likewise, completely nonnumeric 
data, which may include defaults and/or a rich first-order theory of some application 
domain, can bc used. Probabilistic reasoning need not make unrealistic demands of 
the user’s knowledge base. Indeed, in a sense it makes less demands than any other 
reasoning paradigm we know of‘. 
This leads to our next, mom general conclusion, which is that many seemingly 
disparate forms of representation and reasoning c(ltr (and, we believe, should) be unified. 
The first two points listed above suggest that we can take a large step towards this goal 
by simply finding a powerful language (with clear semantics) that subsumes specialized 
representations. The advantages we have Sound (such as a clear and general way of 
using nested defaults, or combining defaults and statistics) apply even if one rejects the 
random-worlds reasoning method itself. But the language is only part of the answer. Can 
diverse types of reasoning really be seen as aspects of a single more general system? 
Clearly this is not always possible; for instance, there are surely some interpretations of 
“defaults” which have no interesting connection to statistics whatsoever. However, we 
think that our work demonstrates that the alleged gap between probabilistic reasoning 
and default reasoning is much narrower than is often thought. In fact, the success of 
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random worlds encourages us to hope that a synthesis between different knowledge 
representation paradigms is possible in most of the interesting domains. 
Appendix A. Proofs of results 
Theorem 5.5. Assume that KB k, rp and KB p, 70. Then KB A f3 b,.,,, rp provided 
that I%,( 9 ) KB A 0) exists. Moreover, a sujficient condition for Pr,(p 1 KB A 0) to 
exist is that Pr, (8 ) KB) exists. 
Proof. Since KB p,, 4, Pr, (-0 1 KB) # 1, so that Pr, (0 1 KB) # 0. Therefore, 
there exists some E > 0 for which we can construct a sequence of pairs N’,?’ as 
follows: N’ is an increasing sequence of domain sizes, li is a decreasing sequence of 
tolerance vectors, and Pr$, (0 ) KB) > E. For these pairs N’, ? we can conclude using 
standard probabilistic reasoning that 
Since Pr, (~4p 1 KB) = 0, it follows that limi,m Prg, (asp j KB) = 0. Moreover, we 
know that for all i, Pr$(B 1 KB) > E > 0. We can therefore take the limit as i + 00, 
and conclude that limi,oo Prc,( 1~ ( KB A 8) = 0. Thus, if Proo( (o 1 KB A 0) exists, it 
must be 1. 
For the second half of the theorem, suppose that Pr,(B ) KB) exists. Since KB k,.,,, 
+I, we must have that Pr, (0 I KB) = p > 0. Therefore, for all 7’ sufficiently small and 
all N sufficiently large (where “sufficiently large” may depend on 73, we can assume 
that Prz(e [ KB) > E > 0. But now, for any such pair N, 7’ we can again prove that 
Taking the limit, we obtain that Pr,( -~rp I KB A 0) must also have a limit that must be 
0. Hence Pr, (v, ) KB A 0) = 1, as desired. 0 
Theorem 5.6. Let KB be a knowledge base of the form $(c’) A KB’, and assume that 
for all suficiently small tolerance vectors ?, 
KBt7’1 t= l(d-3 I9Cx’)lIa E CwPl. 
If no constant in c’ appears in KB’, in p( x’), or in $(x’), then Pr,( cp( Z) I KB) E 
[a, p] , provided the degrees of belief exist. 24 
24 The degree of belief may not exist since lim?,G liminfhr,, Pr;( cp 1 KB) may not be equal to 
lim i-ii lim SU~~_~ Prc( rp ) KB). However, it follows from the proof of the theorem that both these limits 
lie in the interval [a, p] A similar remark holds for many of our later results. 
Proof. First, fix any sufficiently small tolerance vector ?, and consider a domain size N 
for which KB[?] is satisfiable. The proof strategy is to partition the size N worlds that 
satisfy KB[71 into disjoint clusters and then prove that, within each cluster, the proba- 
bility of (p(?) is in the range [cY,/I]. From this, we can show that the (unpartitioned) 
probability is in this range also. 
The size N worlds satisfying KlI[ ?] arc partitioned so that two worlds are in the same 
cluster if and only if they agree on the denotation of all symbols in the vocabulary @ 
except for the constants in (:: Now consider one such cluster, and let A 2 {I,. , N}X 
bc the denotation of’ J/( .a) inside the cluster. That is. if W is a world in the cluster, then 
Note that, since $(2’, does not mention any of the constants in c and the denotation of 
everything else is fixed throughout the cluster, the set A is the same in all worlds W of 
the cluster. Similarly, let B C A be the denotation of cp(.?) A @(x’) in the cluster. Since 
the worlds in the cluster all satisfy KB( ?I, and KB[ ?] k /Ip(Xt) / $(x’) 117 E [a, ,f3], we 
know that /Bl/lA/ E [ a,/3]. S’ lnce none of the constants in c”are mentioned in KB except 
for the statement @Cc’). each k-tuple in A is a legal denotation for C: There is precisely 
one world in the cluster for each such denotation, and all worlds in the cluster are of 
this Ihrm. Among those worlds, only those corresponding to tuples in B satisfy ~(3. 
Therefore, the fraction of worlds in the cluster satisfying p(Z) is \Bl/lAi E [a,p]. 
The probability Pri(cp(c3 1 KB) IS ;I weighted average of the probabilities within the 
individual clusters, so it also has to be in the range [cr,p]. 
It follows that lim infN___ PrG(cp(c3 / KB) and limsup,_,Pr~(~(c~ / KB) are also 
in the range [ CZ, p]. Since this holds for every sufficiently small 7: we conclude that if 
both limits 
lim liminfPri(p(?) / KB) and 
f-6 hfix 
lim limsupPrd(p / KB) 
i 4i .A-+ x 
exist and are equal, then Pr, ((p(F’l 1 KB) has to be in the range [a,P], as desired. Cl 
Theorem 5.16. Let c be u comtmt md let KB be a knowledge buse sati?fying the 
,following conditions: 
(2) KB + (j/o(c). 
(b) for my expressiorr of the ,fi,rrrr Jjp( I) / $( x) // , in KB, it is the cue that either 
KB/=Vx(r,&,(.r) =+$(.I-)) orthutKB~Vx(~~(x) j-@(x)). 
(c) the (predicate, function, mu1 cmstarrt) vynlbols in q(x) appear in KB only 011 
the left-hand side qf the cmditionals in the proportion expressions described it1 
conditiorl ( b ) . 
(d) the constant c does rrot uppear in the jhrmulu p(x). 
Assume that ,for all suficiently mull tolermce vectors ?I 
Therl Pr, ( (D( c) 1 KB) E [ CY. /3 1. provided the degree oj belief exists. 
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Proof. This theorem is proved with the same general strategy we used for Theorem 5.6. 
That is, for each domain size N and tolerance vector 7’, we partition the worlds of size 
N satisfying KB[?l into clusters and prove that, within each cluster, the probability of 
q(c) is in the interval [(Y, p] . As before, this suffices to prove the result. However the 
clusters are defined quite differently in this theorem. 
We define the clusters as maximal sets of worlds satisfying the following three con- 
ditions: 
(1) All worlds in a cluster must agree on the denotation of every vocabulary symbol 
except possibly those appearing in q(x). Note that, in particular, they agree on 
the denotation of the constant c. They must also agree as to which elements 
satisfy cl/o (x) ; let this set be Ao. 
(2) The denotation of symbols in 9 must also be constant, except possibly when 
a member of A0 is involved. More precisely, let & be the set of domain ele- 
ments {I,. . . , N} - Ao. Then for any predicate symbol R or function symbol 
f of arity r appearing in q(x), and for all worlds W’ and W in the cluster, 
if dl,..., d,,d,+l E & then R(dl,.. . ,d,) holds in W’ iff it holds in W, and 
f(dl,. . ,d,) = dr+l in W iff f(dl,. . . ,d,) = dr+l in W’. In particular, this 
means that for any constant symbol c’ appearing in p(x) , if it denotes d’ E & 
in W, then it must denote d’ in W’. 
(3) All .worlds in the cluster are isomorphic with respect to the vocabulary symbols 
in q. More precisely, if W and W’ are two worlds in the cluster, then there exists 
some permutation m of the domain such that for any predicate symbol R appear- 
ing in q(x) and any domain elements dl, . . . , d, E (1,. . . , N}, R(dl, . . . , d,) 
holds in W iff R(n-( dl) , . . . , n( d,) ) holds in W’, and similarly for function sym- 
bols. In particular, for any constant symbol c’ appearing in (p(x), if it denotes 
d’ in W, then it denotes v(d’) in W’. 
It should be clear that clusters so defined are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
We now want to prove that each cluster is, in a precise sense, symmetric with 
respect to the elements in Ao. That is, let r be any permutation of the domain which 
is the identity on any element outside of A0 (i.e., for any d 6 Ao, r(d) = d). Let 
W be any world in our cluster, and let W’ be the world where all the symbols not 
appearing in (p get the same interpretation as they do in W, while the interpretation of 
the symbols appearing in q is obtained from their interpretation in W by applying r 
as described above. We want to prove that W’ is also in the cluster. Condition (1) is 
an immediate consequence of the definition of W’; the restriction on the choice of rr 
implies condition (2) ; condition (3) holds by definition. It remains only to prove that 
W’ /= KB[ Fj . Because of condition (c) in the statement of the theorem, and the fact 
that vocabulary symbols not in rp have the same denotation in W and in W’, this can 
fail to happen only if some expression J(cp( x) 1 $(x) [Ix has different values in W and 
in W’. We show that this is impossible. 
It is easy to see that for all domain elements d, we have (K V?,J b 9(x> iff 
(W’, KF) I= 9(x) ( h w ere V is a valuation mapping x to d), since the symbols not in 
p get the same interpretation in both W and W’. On the other hand, if cp’ is a formula 
that mentions only the symbols appearing in (p, then a straightforward induction on the 
structure of p’ can be used to show that (W, V!7’) k p’(x) iff (W’, T o Vf’) k q’(x), 
where 7~ o V is the valuation that maps x to rr(V(n) ). Thus, if B is the set of elements 
satisfying p(x) in W, then r(B) is the set of elements satisfying q(x) in W’. Let A 
be the set of domain elements satisfying @(.x1 for worlds in this cluster. We want to 
show that jB fl A//IA\ = In-(B) n Al/IA/ or, equivalently, that 
By our observations above, the set 01 domain elements satisfying p(x) A $(x) in W’ 
is z-(B) fl A. By condition (h) there are only two cases: either KB k Yx(&(x) + 
-$(.Y)). in which case A0 and 4 are disjoint, or KB /= Yx($~(x) =+ $(x)), so 
that A,) i A. In the first case. since TT is the identity of Ao, it is easy to see that 
rr( B) (3 A = B n A, and we are done. In the second case, because A0 C A, r is a 
permutation of A into itself, so we must still have /r(B) n Al = IB n Al. We conclude 
that W’ does satisfy KB[ ?I. and is therefore also in the cluster. Since we restricted 
the cluster to consist only of worlds that arc isomorphic to W in the above sense, and 
we have now proved that all worlds formed in this way are in the cluster, the cluster 
contains precisely all such worlds. 
Having defined the clusters. we want to show that the degree of belief of p(c) is 
in the range [a, p] when we look at any single cluster. By assumption, KB[q /= 
//q(x) j $0 (x) /I., t [a, /? 1. Therefore, for each world in the cluster, the subset of the 
elements of A0 that satisfy p(x) is in the interval [a,@]. Moreover, by condition (a), 
KB also entails the assertion @o(c). Therefore, the denotation of c is some domain 
element d in A”. Condition (d) says that c does not appear in (D, and so the denotation 
of C’ is the same for all worlds in the cluster. Now consider a world W in the cluster, 
and let B be the subset of A0 whose members satisfy p(x) in W. We have shown 
that every permutation of the elements in A0 (leaving the remaining elements constant) 
has a corresponding world in the cluster. In particular, all possible subsets B’ of size 
IBJ are possible denotations for cp(x) in worlds in the cluster. Furthermore, because of 
symmetry, they are all equally likely. It follows that the fixed element d satisfies p(x) in 
precisely (BI/IAol of the worlds in the cluster. Since IBI/IAoI E [cy, PI, the probability 
of p(c) in any one cluster is in this range also. 
As in Theorem 5.6, the truth of this fact for each cluster implies its truth in general 
and at the limit. In particular, since KB[?+l k lJ~(x) / (//o(.x)JJ, E [a,/?] for every 
sufficiently small ?, we conclude that Pr,,( p( c) j KB) E [a, /?I, if the limit exists. 0 
Theorem 5.23. Suppose KB has the form 
and,for all i, KB /== ‘v’x(~,$(x~ IS &I(X)) /‘I -~(IIsl/~(x)lI., MI 0). Assume also that 
no symbol appearing in q(x) appears in KB’ or in any @i(c). Further suppose that, 
for some ,j, [ aj, pj] is the tightest interval. That is, for all i # j, LY; < ai < /3j < /3i. 
Then. if it exists, 
Pr,(v(c) I KB) E [ai.P,l 
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Proof. The proof of the theorem is based on the following result. Consider any KB of 
the form 
+ll~‘(x)II, Ml 0) A 
Wrcl’(x) =+- ti(x)) A 
a ie Ildx> I 9(x) II+ ir PA 
KB' , 
where none of KB’, $I( x) , t,b’ (x) mention any symbol appearing in p(x) . Then, for any 
E > 0, 
Pr,(a - E Q I\v(x) I9’(~>11, < P + E 1 KB) = 1. 
Note that this is quite similar in spirit to Theorem 5.16, where we proved that (under 
certain conditions) an individual c satisfying $(c) “inherits” the statistics over e(x) ; 
that is, the degree of belief is derived from these statistics. Not surprisingly, the proof of 
the new result is similar to that of Theorem 5.16, and we refer the reader to that proof 
for many of the details. 
We begin by clustering worlds exactly as in the earlier proof, with ti(x) playing 
the role of the earlier $0 (x). Now consider any particular cluster and let A be the 
corresponding denotation of $(x) . In the cluster, the proportion of A that satisfies q(x) 
is some y such that cr - TP < y < j3 + T,.. (Recall that T! and TV are the tolerances 
associated with the approximate comparisons Z[ and x,. in KB). In this cluster, the 
denotation of q(x) in A ranges over subsets of A of size ylA\. From the proof of 
Theorem 5.16, we know that there is, in fact, an equal number of worlds in the cluster 
corresponding to every such subset. 
Now let A’ be the denotation of e’(x) in the cluster (recall that it follows from the 
construction of the clusters that all worlds in a cluster have the same denotation for 
I,V (n) ) . For a proportion y’ E [ 0, 1 ] , we are interested in computing the fraction of 
worlds in the cluster such that the proportion of p(x) in A’ is y’. From our discussion 
above, it follows that this is a purely combinatorial question: given a set A of size n and a 
subset A’ of size n’, how many ways are there of choosing yn elements (representing the 
elements for which q(x) holds) so that y’n’ elements come from A’? We estimate this 
using the observation that the distribution of y’n’ is derived from a process of sampling 
without replacement. 25 Hence, it behaves according to the well-known hypergeometric 
distribution (see, for example, [ 451) . We can thus conclude that y’ is distributed with 
mean y and variance 
Y(l-y)(n-n’) < y(l-y) < _1_ 
(n-1)n’ ’ nr ’ 4n” 
Since KB + ~(~~t+b’(x)~~, MI 0), we know that n’ = IA’\ > TIN. Thus, this variance 
tends to 0 as N grows large. Now, consider the event: “a world in the cluster has a 
25 There are, in fact, a number of ways to solve this problem. One alternative is to use. an entropy-based 
technique. We can do this because, at this point in the proof, it no longer matters whether KB uses nonunary 
predicates or not; we can therefore safely apply techniques that usually only work in the unary case. 
proportion of p(x) within A’ which is not in the interval [Y--E, Y+E]“. By Chebychev’s 
inequality, this is bounded from above by some small probability I)~ which depends 
only on 71 N. That is. the fraction of worlds in each cluster that have the “wrong” 
proportion is at most r>,v. Since this is the case for every cluster, it is also true in 
general. More precisely, the I‘raction of overall worlds for which J/p(x) j qJ~‘(x)ll., @ 
INS T, E, p + T, + E 1 is at most />h. But this probability goes to 0 as N tends to 
infinity. Therelhrc. 
Pri, ( a -- T, uljpc.\r ~~I/‘(.~-),/,-..~+~,+EIKL~)=I 
As i 4 C? WC can simply omit T, ;~nd 7,. proving the required result. 
It is now a simple matter to prove the theorem itself. Consider the following modifi- 
cation KU” of the KB given in the statement of the theorem: 
l,, 
A (u, j,, l/p(x) / tl/,(.v;/, 7, fi’,, ,“‘$I (c) A KB’. 
r=, 
where WC eliminate the statistics l’or the rct’ercncc classes that are contained in $,; (the 
more specific reference classes ). From Theorem 5.16 we can conclude that Pr, ( (D( c) j 
KB”) E [ cu,,p, J (the conditions of that theorem are clearly satisfied). But we also 
know, from the result above. that for each $,. for i < ,j: 
Pr,(cv; -E s /(p(x) _ (//‘(.vJ/~, C 0: - t KB”) = I 
For sufficiently small E > 0, the assertion that 
ffl E < I(cp(.i) / t/7(.\ I/:, I_ /l3, - c 
logically implies that 
a, 51, Ilds) / $‘(.i-)/I, _I!,, p,. 
so that this latter assertion also has probability 1 given KB”. We therefore also have 
probability 1 (given KB”) in the finite conjunction 
We can now apply Thcorcm 5.2 to conclude that WC can add this finite conjunction to 
KB” without affecting any of the degrees ol‘ belief. But the knowledge base resulting 
from adding this conjunction to KB” is precisely the original KB. We conclude that 
Pr,(p(c) 1 KB) =Pr,(gt(,) / KB”) ‘x Iu,.~,], 
as required. 0 
Theorem 5.26. Let P be u UIILI~J predicate, md cotlsider a blowledge base KB of the 
follo~tGg form: 
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/i (llp(X) ( ccli(X>ll xxi~iA\(cri(C))A i q!X($i(X) A$j(X>)9 
i=l i.j=l. i#,j 
139 
whereeither~~<1foralli=1,...,m,orLu~>Oforalli=1,...,m.Then,ifneither 
P nor c appear anywhere in the formulas $i (x) , then 
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that Lyi > 0 for i = 1,. . . , m. As in previous 
theorems, we prove the result by dividing the worlds into clusters. More precisely, 
consider any 7’such that q - ri > 0. Let /3i = min(cui + ri, 1) . For any such 7’ and any 
domain size N, we divide the worlds of size N satisfying KB[q into clusters, and prove 
that, within each cluster, the probability of q(c) is in the interval [S(q - 71,. . . , an, - 
~“,),wh9... , f3,) 1. Since 6 is a continuous function at these points, this suffices to 
prove the theorem. 
We partition the worlds satisfying KB[?j into maximal clusters that satisfy the fol- 
lowing three conditions: 
(1) All worlds in a cluster must agree on the denotation of every vocabulary symbol 
except for P. In particular, the denotations of $1 (x), . . . , &!(x> is fixed. For 
i = l,... , m, let Ai denote the denotation of +i (x) in the cluster, and let ni 
denote /Ail. 
(2) All worlds in a cluster must have the same denotation of P for elements in 
X=(1,... , N} - IJzt Ai. 
(3) For all i = I,..., m, all worlds in the cluster must have the same number of 
elements ri satisfying P within each set Ai. Note that, since all worlds in the 
cluster satisfy KB[ 3, it follows that ri/ui E [ (Yi - Ti, pi] for i = 1,. . . , m. 
Now, consider a cluster as defined above. The assumptions of the theorem imply 
that, besides the proportion constraints defined by the numbers ri, there are no other 
constraints on the denotation of P within the sets Al,. . . , A,,. Therefore, all possible 
denotations of P satisfying these constraints are possible. Let d be the denotation of c 
in this cluster. Our assumptions guarantee that d is the only member of Ai n A,i. Hence, 
the number of elements of A; for which P has not yet been chosen is ni - 1. In worlds 
that satisfy P(c) , precisely ri - I of these elements must satisfy P. Since the Ai are 
disjoint except for d, the choice of P within each Ai can be made independently of the 
other choices. Therefore, the number of worlds in the cluster where P(c) holds is 
fi(::I:) 
i=l 
Similarly, the number of worlds in the cluster for which P(c) does not hold is 
fi (y 1). 
i=l 
Therefore, the fraction of worlds in the cluster satisfying P(c) is: 
Since 6 is easily seen to he monotonically increasing in each of its arguments and 
1.,/H, E 1 cr, - 7,. p, 1, we must have that S( 1-1 .ittl , , ~,,,/a,,,) is in the interval 
I8la, - 71.. . a,,, ~~ T,,, 1. S(B,. . pm 1 J 
Using the same argument as in the previous theorems and the continuity of 8, we deduce 
the desired result. 0 
Theorem 5.27. Let @I atld @z he two su0~mabuluries of @ that are disjoint except for 
the cormant c. Consider KBI , ~1 t C( @I ) and KB2,92 E L( ~02). Then 
Pr,((pt Apz / KBI AK&) =Pr,(cpt 1 KB,) xPr,(qop / KB?). 
Proof. Fix N, ?, and d with I 6 d & N. Given a vocabulary p containing c, let 
Worlds$‘.*([) consist of all worlds in WN C ty 1 such that (w ?) /= [ and the denotation 
of L’ in W is d. and let # \vorlds~i.“([) = I+vorlds$i.y([)/.2h It should be clear that 
for each choice of d, the sets world.~$i.‘” (5) have equal size. Thus, # worlds? (5) = 
N# world.$“*(,$). If51 is a formula in @t and (2 is a formula in @2, then there is clearly 
a bijection between worlds$i.@‘U’b’ (51 A & ) and worlds$i:@’ (4t ) x worlds;“@ (52). It 
follows that # worlds”i.@1u@2 (51 A 52 ) = # worlds;i’@” (51) x # worlds$i,@D2 (&). Since 
# worlds?([) = N# torlds:‘,:i.“(<). we immediately get 
= 
# \vorldsF’ (~1 A KBl ) x # worlds?’ ((~2 A KB2) 
# worlds$@ (KB, ) x # worlds$@’ (KB2 ) 
=Pr:*l(qt 1 KB,) x PrF’(p2 j KB2). 
x Note that we are careful to mention the vocabulary 111 the superscript here, rather than suppressing it as we 
have up to now. This is because the vocabulary used plays a significant role in this proof. 
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Taking limits, we get that 
PrzU@P’(p, A(P:! [ KB! AK&) =Prz((o, 1 KBl) .Prz(rp;? (KB2). 
As observed in [ 27 J, for all formulas p and KB, if @ _> CD’, then 
PrL(p 1 KB) =PrE(p) KB). 
(Intuitively, this is because the effect of changing the vocabulary cancels out in the 
numerator and denominator.) We thus get 
Pr,(ql A 402 I KBI A K&j = Pr,(rpi I K&) .Pr,(e I K&j, 
as desired. 0 
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